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Summary 
This paper explores the extent to which working time legislation in Thailand 
and Sweden protects the right to decent working time for domestic workers.  
This is examined through a comparative analysis of the national working 
time legislation in the two countries and the parameters of decent working 
time established in international labor law. This is the basis for a subsequent 
discussion on the regulation of working time in domestic work from a 
materialist feminist perspective. The research questions posed include: what 
is the content of the right to decent working time in international labor law? 
To what extent does national labor law regulate and protect the right to 
decent working time for domestic workers in Thailand and Sweden, and 
what similarities and differences are there between Thailand and Sweden in 
this regard? How can a lack of consideration for this right in Thai and 
Swedish labor regulation be understood from a materialist feminist 
perspective?  
To answer these questions, the paper provides a legal dogmatic analysis 
of the content of the right to decent working time in international law, 
examining international labor standards and other parameters established by 
the International Labor Organization (ILO). It also examines the regulation 
of working time in domestic work in Thailand and Sweden, to conclude that 
the right to decent working time for this group of workers often is 
insufficiently protected in the national legislation. Some groups of domestic 
workers work longer hours than general limitations on working time permit, 
while other groups are excluded from the scope of protective labor 
legislation. The concluding part of the paper is a discussion on the failure to 
regulate and protect the right to decent working time in domestic work from 
the perspective of materialist feminist theory. The last chapter is a 
discussion on working time legislation for domestic workers in relation to 
the different roles of women in the international division of labor and 
patriarchal and racist notions inherent in the capitalist system that, according 
to materialist feminist theory, have led to a general devaluation of women’s 
work.  
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Sammanfattning 
Denna uppsats syftar till att undersöka i vilken utsträckning 
arbetstidslagstiftningen i Thailand och Sverige skyddar rätten till decent 
working time för hushållsarbetare. För att uppnå detta jämförs 
arbetstidslagstiftningen i de två länderna med hur decent working time 
definieras inom den internationella arbetsrätten. Denna analys utgör grunden 
för en diskussion om arbetstidsregleringen för hushållsarbete från ett 
materialistiskt-feministiskt perspektiv.  
Uppsatsen söker besvara dessa centrala forskningsfrågor: hur är rätten till 
decent working time formulerad i internationell arbetsrätt? I vilken 
utsträckning skyddar och reglerar den nationella arbetsrätten denna rättighet 
för hushållsarbetare i Thailand och Sverige, samt vilka likheter och 
skillnader finns det mellan lagstiftningen i Thailand och Sverige i detta 
avseende? Hur kan ett svagt skydd för denna rättighet inom den thailändska 
och svenska arbetsrätten förstås från ett materialistiskt-feministiskt 
perspektiv? 
Första delen av uppsatsen består av en rättdogmatisk analys av 
internationella konventioner och doktrin. Denna del utreder vad rätten till 
decent working time består av enligt ILOs normbildande arbete. För att 
skydda denna rättighet måste nationell lagstiftning upprätthålla samma 
begränsningar av antalet arbetstimmar, samt bejaka de krav som ställs på 
raster, vilotid och semester. Den nationella regleringen av arbetstid måste 
också bejaka de dimensioner av decent working time som fastslagits i ILOs 
arbetstidsforskning – hälsosam arbetstid, arbetstid som går att kombinera 
med familjeliv, arbetstid som bejakar jämställdhet, produktiv arbetstid och 
arbetstid som arbetstagaren till någon grad kan besluta över. Sedan följer en 
genomgång av arbetstidslagstiftningen inom hushållsarbete i Thailand och 
Sverige, som ligger till grund för en analys av huruvida rätten till decent 
working time inom hushållsarbete skyddas i den nationella lagstiftningen i 
dessa två länder. Slutsatsen är att det arbetsrättsliga skyddet för 
hushållsarbetare i detta hänseende ofta är svagare än för andra arbetstagare, 
vilket strider mot de krav som ställs inom den internationella arbetsrätten. 
Vissa grupper av hushållsarbetare tillåts arbeta längre övriga arbetstagare, 
andra grupper omfattas inte av skyddsarbetslagstiftning. Den avslutande 
delen av uppsatsen diskuterar dessa vanligt förekommande brister i 
arbetstidslagstiftningen ur ett materialistiskt-feministiskt perspektiv. 
Kapitlet kopplar dessa rättsliga brister till kvinnors roll inom den 
internationella arbetsfördelningen, med särskilt fokus på hur patriarkala och 
rasistiska föreställningar legat till grund för en undervärdering av kvinnors 
arbete. 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Subject  
Working time regulation is a central issue on the labor market. It has been a 
concern of the International Labour Organization since its genesis in 1919. 
The first convention adopted by the International Labour Conference 
concerned the working hours in industrial undertakings and set the limit of 
acceptable working time to 48 hours per week. Today, decent working time 
is an integral part of ILO’s Decent Work Agenda. Rules to protect the right 
to decent work is meant to be implemented at the national level, guided by 
the standards set in international labor instruments.  
Despite international attention to decent limits on working time, working 
hours in domestic work is often neglected by national legislators. To 
improve the protection for domestic workers, the International Labour 
Organization adopted the Convention concerning Decent Work for 
Domestic Workers, (No. 189) and Recommendation, (No. 201) in 2011. The 
Preamble of the Convention recalls the ‘commitment of the International 
Labour Organization to promote decent work for all’. A review produced by 
the International Labour Office shows that over half of the countries 
surveyed allows longer hours for domestic workers than other categories of 
workers (International Labour Conference, 2010, p. 49). As the title of this 
paper suggests, decent working time for domestic workers is far from being 
realized in many countries. 
1.2 Purpose and Research Questions 
This paper explores the extent to which the national legislation of Thailand 
and Sweden protects the right to decent working time for domestic workers. 
This is examined through a comparative analysis of the parameters of decent 
working time and working time legislation in the two countries, which is the 
basis for the subsequent discussion on domestic work from a materialist 
feminist perspective on possible reasons for the elusiveness of the right to 
decent working time for these workers.  
Insufficient protection of the right to decent working time in this sector 
is a feature of the labor legislation in almost every country. One purpose of 
this paper is thus to discuss the lack of protection for domestic workers, not 
only in the national legal context but also with regard to the role of 
reproductive labor in the international division of labor. To achieve the 
stated aim, the paper seeks to answer the following central research 
questions: 
 What is the content of the right to decent working time in 
international labor law? 
 To what extent does national labor law regulate and protect the right 
to decent working time for domestic workers in Thailand and 
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Sweden, and what similarities and differences are there between 
Thailand and Sweden in this regard? 
 How can a lack of consideration for this right in Thai and Swedish 
labor regulation be understood from a materialist feminist 
perspective?  
1.3 Materialist Feminist Theory 
The theoretical framework of the thesis is material feminism. This 
theoretical perspective is applied to relate legislation on working time for 
domestic work to the role of women’s work, especially reproductive labor, 
in the new international division of labor, commonly understood as the 
‘international restructuring of commodity production that has taken place 
since the mid ‘70s, when … the multinational corporations began to relocate 
their industrial outfits, especially in labor-intensive sectors like textile and 
electronics, in the “developing countries”’ (Federici, 2012, p. 67). This 
division of labor, resulting from the globalization of the labor market, has 
also introduced an ‘international redistribution of reproductive work’ and 
‘transformed the “Third World” into an immense pool’ of cheap productive 
and reproductive labor (ibid., p. 70). While the new international division of 
labor affects all women, it affects women differently depending on race, 
class and citizenship (James, 2012, p. 176). With regard to reproductive 
work, the organization of labor has created a hierarchical relationship 
between women, ‘similar to of that between white and black women under 
the apartheid regime in South Africa’ (Federici, 2012, p. 73). Since the early 
1990s, female migrants from the global South constitute an ‘increasing 
percentage of the workforce employed in the service sector and domestic 
labor’ in the North, a process described by Federici as a ‘new colonial 
solution to the “housework question”’ (ibid., pp. 71–73).   
The role of the housewife in the organization of labor in society is central 
to the discussion on the role and regulation of paid domestic work from a 
materialist feminist perspective. In labor law, work and family has 
traditionally been viewed as ‘two separate spheres which occasionally 
collide’ (Conaghan, 2005, p. 26). Conaghan speaks of an official narrative 
on how these spheres have only recently converged as a result of women’s 
participation in the labor market. Before women joined the workforce, these 
spheres ‘served different social functions, met different human needs, and 
involved the pursuit of different kind of activities’, according to this 
narrative. Conaghan rejects this view of the relationship between work and 
family, in favor of a narrative of long-term interdependence:  
‘… for workers to be free to engage in paid work on an exclusive, 
timed work basis, arrangements must be in place to ensure that other 
essential social tasks, particularly those associated with the short-term 
and long-term reproduction of labour, continue to the carried out’ 
(ibid.,  p. 28).    
The need has resulted in a ‘gendered allocation of labour’ (ibid., p. 29), i.e. a 
male breadwinner and an unwaged housewife. The organization of labor in 
the capitalist system is based on this couple (Mies, 1986, pp. 109–110). 
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Women are defined as housewives in contrast to their worker husbands and 
their labor is defined as unpaid housework in contrast to their husbands’ 
wage-work. This gendered allocation of labor creates a ‘de facto class 
division between working-class men and women’ (ibid.). Mies speaks of the 
housewifization of women to describe a process of ‘externalization, or ex-
territorialization of costs which otherwise would have to be covered by 
capitalists’. In this process, women are reduced to housewives, not workers; 
women’s labor becomes a ‘natural resource, freely available like air and 
water’. All work performed by women – waged and unwaged – is devalued 
as a result of this ‘myth of female incapacity’, to speak with James (2012, 
pp. 54–55). According to Mies (1986, p. 120) the process of 
housewifization:  
‘makes a large part of labour that is exploited and super-exploited for 
the market invisible; it justifies low wages; prevents women from 
organizing; keeps them atomized; gears their attention to a sexist and 
patriarchal image of women, namely the “real” housewife, supported 
by a man, which is not only not realizable for the majority of women, 
but also destructive from a point of view of women’s liberation.’  
The mystification of women as housewives under capitalism is a ‘necessary 
pre-condition’ for the smooth functioning of a system with a central aim to 
reduce the cost of labor (ibid.). In this process, reproductive labor has come 
to be defined as a natural attribute of the female character. Reproductive 
labor is often understood as domestic labor or unwaged housework 
traditionally performed by women. Reproductive labor is the ‘complex of 
activities and relations by which our life and labor are daily reconstituted’ 
(Federici, 2012, p. 5), and therefore ‘the foundation of every economic and 
political system’ (ibid., p. 2).  
These central concepts of the material feminism are instrumental in the 
discussion on the regulation of working time for domestic workers in 
Thailand and Sweden. 
1.4 Method and Material  
Legal dogmatic method is the interpretation of sources of law to establish 
lex lata (Kulin-Olsson, 2011). In the first part of the paper, this method is 
used to determine the content of the right to decent working time in 
international law. Article 38.1 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice lists treaties, international customs, and general principles as primary 
sources of law. Judicial decisions and scholarly writings are designated as 
subsidiary sources. The analysis of the right to decent working time is based 
on primary sources of law, such as international labor standards drafted by 
the ILO's constituents and ratified by member states. These instruments 
constitute legally binding norms on working time. Relevant information is 
also found in the recommendations adopted by the International Labour 
Organization. These labor standards are non-binding guidelines. They often 
supplement conventions with additional or more detailed provisions, or 
address important issues outside the scope of the convention. Provisions of 
other human rights instruments of binding and non-binding nature, such as 
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the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, are briefly discussed to place the 
right to decent working time within the broader context of human rights. 
Secondary sources in the form of academic literature on the subject are also 
relevant in the examination of the concept of decent working time.  
The second part of the paper is a comparative analysis of the national 
laws of Thailand and Sweden. The comparative method is used to examine 
similarities and differences in laws on working hours for domestic work, 
and analyze how they advance the realization of decent working time from 
the perspective of materialist feminism. The first step in comparative labor 
law is to produce a scientific analysis of relevant law and practice in two or 
more legal systems to compare any similarities and differences (Blanpain, 
2001, p. 5). Legal dogmatic method is used here. As a member of the 
European Union, Sweden is bound by the Union acquis. Swedish labor law 
is informed by directives passed by the institutions of the European Union 
and the judgments of the European Court of Justice. Other central sources of 
law are statutes, case law, preparatory work, and legal doctrine (Kulin-
Olsson, 2011). In the field of labor law, collective agreements between trade 
union and employers’ organizations constitute another, and most significant, 
source of law. The main sources of law in Thailand are the constitution, acts 
and statutes, subordinate legislations such as regulations, and Supreme 
Court judgments. Collective agreements may also inform the conditions of 
employment. In addition to these legal sources, reports by ILO and national 
labor organizations provide information on national legislation. Other 
written material of importance is academic literature on the subject of 
national law. Information on the specific situation in each country has also 
been obtained through interviews with staff of organizations and trade 
unions. Important information on the rights of Thai domestic workers has 
been provided by Ms. Poonsap Tulaphan, manager of the Foundation for 
Labour and Employment Promotion (Homenet Thailand). For the situation 
in Sweden, relevant information has been supplied by Anita Lundberg, 
ombudsman at Kommunal – the Swedish Municipal Workers’ Union.   
The use of comparative method naturally contains certain obstacles. 
Challenges related to language and terminology are common in comparative 
labor law (Blanpain, 2001, pp. 16–17). A problem of this kind in this study 
is the inability to use legal sources of Thai law in its original language. Any 
primary sources, such as statutes and regulations, have been translated into 
English. This is a limitation of the scientific accuracy of the study. To 
overcome this problem, secondary sources of highest possible authority 
have been used, for example NATLEX – the legal database of the ILO. The 
accuracy of the translation of any legislation or case law has also been 
discussed with legal scholars. A second challenge inherent in the 
comparative method is the transplantability issue. Every national regulation 
is part of a larger legal system, shaped by conditions specific to the country 
in question. One cannot assume that similar legislation has the same effect 
in different legal settings. Still, some legal concepts are more easily 
transplanted than others (Blanpain, 2001, pp. 18–20). Kahn-Freund speaks 
of ‘degrees of transferability’ (1974, p. 6). He argues that rules relating to 
collective labor law, which directly affects the distribution of power in the 
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industrial relations system, are more difficult to transplant than norms that 
fall under individual labor law, such as limitations on hours of work. 
Transplantation of such protection standards is often quite successful, as 
illustrated by the success of many ILO Conventions on such subjects 
(Blanpain, 2001, p. 20). 
The last part of the thesis is an analysis of relation between the role of 
domestic work in society and the failure to achieve decent working time for 
these workers. The results from the comparative analysis of Thai and 
Swedish labor law are explored from a material feminist perspective. The 
understanding of domestic work as a traditional means to exploit women in 
a capitalist and patriarchal system is central to this theory. Feminist 
literature on domestic work and the international division of labor is used to 
situate this type of work within the broader context of society.  
1.5   Delimitations and Central Concepts 
To define domestic work on the basis of the tasks performed by the worker 
has proven to be almost impossible. Domestic workers perform a wide 
range of tasks such as cleaning, cooking, doing laundry, and caring for 
children and elders. The understanding of what domestic work entails is 
dependent on a number of factors, inter alia, the national context. Using the 
definition of domestic work established in the Convention concerning 
Decent Work for Domestic Workers, 2011 (No. 189), domestic work is 
understood here as ‘work performed in or for a household or households’ 
(Article 1). Domestic worker means ‘any person engaged in domestic work 
within an employment relationship’. This definition of domestic workers 
includes au pairs. Their working days are shorter than normal to allow for 
language studies. Certain laws that regulate domestic work are also 
applicable to au pairs. This paper will only cover the legal protection of au 
pairs to the extent that it overlaps with the general labor law on domestic 
work. Rules applicable to this specific type of employment only will not be 
discussed.  
The problems relating to working conditions in domestic work are 
numerous. Domestic workers are vulnerable workers; physical and mental 
abuse by the employer is common. Forced labor is prevalent in this sector. 
Furthermore, many domestic workers are children. This paper is focused on 
working time. The lack of protection of the private time of these workers is 
significant: the unusually long working hours of this category of workers 
hinders them from enjoying a life outside waged work to the same degree as 
other employees. 
The study focuses mainly on statutory regulation rather than norms 
established through collective bargaining. The low percentage of organized 
domestic workers is an important issue that affects the protection of their 
rights at work. While this paper does not offer a deeper analysis of this 
challenge, the role of collective agreements is acknowledged and discussed, 
especially in the case of Sweden. 
The paper examines labor legislation in Thailand and Sweden. The 
national circumstances of these countries pose different challenges to the 
situation for domestic workers depending on, inter alia, the degree of 
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formality of domestic work, how the employment relationship is organized 
and the prevalence of unionization. The situation in these countries does not 
give a complete picture of the possibility of achieving decent work for 
domestic workers, but are meant to demonstrate the universality of some 
challenges that appear almost inherent in domestic labor. With regards to the 
geographical scope of the study, in the case of Thailand, the comparison is 
limited to domestic workers in Bangkok. Though the national legal system 
is generally applicable, labor norms may differ between the capital and rural 
areas. In addition, the differences between the situation for workers in the 
capital and in other areas are sometimes of such magnitude that is it difficult 
to speak of labor issues in a general manner. In Sweden, the discrepancies in 
the application of legal norms in metropolitan areas and rural areas are 
insignificant, making statements on the general situation in this country less 
problematic.   
1.6 Current Research 
Important scholars in the field of working time research are Jon C. 
Messenger and Sangheon Lee. Jon C. Messenger is specialized in, inter alia, 
working time issues, gender and the informal economy. Sangheon Lee has 
published research on working time as well as other employment conditions 
and quality of employment. Another important researcher is Deidre 
McCann, who has published research on working time and the balance 
between work and family life from a legal perspective (Lee et al., 2007, p. 
xiii). These researchers have explored the concept of decent working time in 
several publications – together and in collaboration with others. This thesis 
applies some of what they have written on the subject of decent working 
time to the specific situation of domestic workers in Thailand and Sweden. 
The International Labour Office is influential in this field of research. 
Publications include research on working time specifically in reference to 
the situation for domestic workers.  
Legal scholars who have published on the topic of domestic work are, for 
example, Judy Fudge and Catharina Calleman. The latter has written 
extensively on the subject of domestic work in Sweden. Fudge has 
examined domestic work from an international legal perspective. Both 
researchers examine the relationship between the precariousness of work 
and the socio-economic status of the workers. The precariousness of 
domestic work has also been studied by scholars outside the legal sphere, 
for example by sociologists Rhacel Salazar Parreñas and Bridget Anderson.  
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2 The Right to Decent Working 
Time in International Law  
The objective of this chapter is to introduce the content of the right to decent 
working time. The concept has been developed by the International Labour 
Organization. The chapter will also introduce the basic characteristics of the 
Organization and its Decent Work Agenda. After this, an examination of the 
concept of decent working time, as informed by international labor 
standards and research on working time issues, follows. Provisions on 
working time in other human rights instruments are also examined. Finally, 
the content of the right to decent working time for domestic workers is 
examined. This includes an examination of recent developments in 
international law, specifically the adoption of the Convention concerning 
Decent Work for Domestic Workers, 2011 (No. 189) and Recommendation, 
(No. 201).  
2.1 The International Labour Organization 
and the Decent Work Agenda 
Labor law has traditionally been characterized as employee protection law. 
This view is employed by the International Labour Organization, 
established by the Peace Treaty of Versailles in 1919 (Vranken, 2009, p. 
34). The Preamble of the ILO Constitution calls for an improvement in 
working conditions that involve ‘injustice, hardship and privation’, in order 
to prevent ‘unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are 
imperilled’. A number of areas in which worker protection must prevail are 
then listed.  
The Preamble also emphasizes the need for international labor standards 
‘whereas also the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour 
is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the 
conditions in their own countries’. A central function of the ILO is to 
establish such international labor standards for the protection of workers. 
This process is regulated by Article 19 of the ILO Constitution. 
International labor standards are found in conventions and 
recommendations. Conventions create legally binding obligations for 
ratifying States, while recommendations supplement conventions and give 
‘guidance as to policy, legislation and practice’ (International Labour 
Office, 2012, p. 2). The conventions and recommendations adopted by the 
International Labour Conference are minimum standards, and shall not be 
‘deemed to affect any law, award, custom or agreement which ensures more 
favorable conditions to the workers concerned than those provided for in the 
Convention or Recommendation’ (Article 19, para. 8). International labor 
standards are characterized by a high degree of flexibility, which is created 
through, for example, ‘clauses allowing (sometimes temporarily) acceptance 
of a specified lower standard by countries where, for example, no legislation 
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on the subject in question existed prior to ratification or where the economy 
or administrative or medical facilities are insufficiently developed’, or 
‘clauses allowing exclusion of, for example, specified categories of 
occupations or enterprises or sparsely populated or undeveloped areas’ 
(International Labour Office, 2012, pp. 42–43).  
As a general rule, member states are only bound by legal obligations in 
conventions that they have ratified. However, as established in the 1998 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, all members of 
the ILO are bound by four core principles on the basis of their membership, 
specifically: the freedom of association and the effective recognition of the 
right to collective bargaining, the effective abolition of child labor, the 
elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor, and the elimination 
of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. These 
principles are also covered in eight core conventions. In addition to these 
eight conventions, the ILO has awarded special priority to four governance 
conventions that are fundamental for the practical achievement of 
international labor standards. Other conventions are referred to as technical 
instruments.  
The implementation of ratified conventions and other labor standards on 
the national level is overseen by a number of supervisory mechanisms, 
unique to of the ILO. According to Article 22 of the ILO Constitution, 
member states shall submit reports on the progress to a supervisory body 
called the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations, which consist of 20 legal experts. The Committee of 
Experts then comments on the reports. This is known as the regular 
supervisory procedure. In addition, Articles 24 and 26 of the Constitution 
allow for special complaints procedures, where the failure of a member 
State to ‘secure in any respect the effective observance’ of a convention can 
be referred to Governing Body (Boivin and Odero, 2006, pp. 207–209).  
Decent work for everyone is the aim of all activities of the Organization 
today. This was first coined in 1999 by then Director-General Juan Somavía 
in his report for the 87
th
 session of the International Labour Conference. 
Decent work is understood as productive work carried out in conditions of 
freedom, equity, security and human dignity (International Labour Office, 
1999, p. 3). Decent work must permeate every branch of the world of work. 
As a result of the economic globalization, changes in the ‘the nature and 
form of employment relationships’ have occurred in developing as well as 
developed nations (Fudge and Owens, 2006, pp. 20–21). This has 
necessitated a shift in focus toward the informal labor market and those 
outside standard employment relationships, such as the self-employed and 
those in reproductive labor (International Labour Office, 1999, pp. 3–4). 
The view of the ILO is that ‘all those who work have rights at work’ (ibid.).  
To achieve decent work for everyone, the ILO has adopted the Decent 
Work Agenda, which in addition to workers’ protection also calls for the 
‘respect of democracy in overall labour relations, including at the 
workplace’ (Bronstein, 2009, pp. 1–2). This Agenda is intended to achieve 
the goal of decent work through the implementation of four strategic 
objectives: the promotion of rights at work; employment; social protection; 
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and social dialogue. Gender equality is a crosscutting objective at the core 
of the Decent Work Agenda. 
2.2 Decent Working Time  
Reasonable limitations on working time are a core concern of the 
International Labour Organization and its Decent Work Agenda. Decent 
working hours is relevant to the promotion of rights at work and the 
consolidation of social protection – two strategic objectives of the Agenda. 
The content of the right to decent working time is based on limitations on 
working time established by the international labor standards and current 
research. Discussions on decent working time have been most prevalent in 
wealthy European countries. This is also where much of modern labor law 
was born as ‘reaction to both the excesses of the Industrial Revolution and 
the abuse of rights arising out of nineteenth century civil law’ (Bronstein, 
2009, p. 1). The European workers have seen a ‘progressive reduction’ of 
working hours during the last century (McCann, 2004, p. 10). Today, this 
process of reduction has come to a halt. Instead, the focus of working time 
policies has shifted towards flexibility in the labor market (ibid., p. 11). This 
has involved the ‘relaxation of restrictions on varying and individualizing 
working time schedules and on work during unsocial hours’ (ibid., p. 12). 
The progress towards a standardization of daily and weekly working time 
has now been replaced by ‘diversification, decentralization and 
individualization of working hours’ (Anxo et al., 2004a, p. 2).  
Discussions on the organization of working hours and its compatibility 
with decent working time play a minor role in low- and middle-income 
countries, where working time standards often are more generous than in the 
West. Incentives for legal tools to increase flexibility are often weak in these 
countries: overtime may be ‘readily available’ for the employer to enhance 
working time flexibility and informal employment is prevalent (Lee et al., 
2007, pp. 2–3). 
The call for flexibility in low- and middle-income countries as well as 
high-income nations has led to a discussion within ILO on the need for an 
update of current working time standards. In a General Survey submitted to 
the International Labour Conference in 2005, the Committee of Experts 
acknowledges that ‘Conventions Nos. 1 and 30 do not fully reflect modern 
realities in the regulation of working time’ (International Labour 
Conference, 2005, para. 322). The Committee noted further that ‘these two 
instruments are viewed in an increasing number of countries as prescribing 
overly rigid standards’ and that ‘the “fixed” working hours system adopted 
by both conventions as a cornerstone for the regulation of working time 
conflicts with today’s demands for more flexibility’ (para. 323). The 
Committee emphasized that international minimum standards of working 
hours are still relevant, especially from a human rights perspective, but that 
“the changes that have taken place since these two instruments were adopted 
warrant their revision” (paras. 317 and 328). As is evident from the above, 
current limitations on working time are questioned by the constituents of 
ILO. The standards are increasingly deviated from, not only in low- and 
middle–income countries but also in high-income nations. While members 
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of the ILO constituency call for more flexible solutions in working time 
regulation to, for example, increase profitability, they are bound by current 
labor instruments. These conventions create the legal parameters of decent 
working time today. In addition, the ILO has proposed five essential 
dimensions of decent working time based on existing legal standards as well 
as research on working time. These dimensions are meant to act as 
guidelines for the advancement of decent working time for everyone 
(Messenger, 2006, p. 420).  
2.2.1 International Labor Standards on Working 
Time  
The regulation of hours of work has been a core concern for the ILO since 
its birth. The Peace Treaty of Versailles, by which the ILO was created, 
contained nine principles of importance for the social policy of the League 
of Nations. One of these principles was the eight-hour working day and the 
48-hour working week; another was the principle of twenty-four hours of 
weekly rest for workers (Lee et al., 2007, pp. 8–9). The Preamble of the ILO 
Constitution outlines how the improvement of the regulation of working 
hours, ‘including the establishment of a maximum working day and week’, 
is a condition for social justice and ‘universal and lasting peace’.  
ILO has adopted international labor standards of binding nature to limit 
working hours. The first convention of the Organization was the Hours of 
Work (Industry) Convention, 1919 (No. 1), which established the 48-hour 
working week as standard for the industry (Article 1). The same limit was 
later adopted for workers in commerce and offices (Article 3 of the Hours of 
Work [Commerce and Offices] Convention, 1930 [No. 30]). A normal 
working day should not exceed eight hours according to these conventions 
(Article 2 of the Hours of Work [Industry] Convention, 1919 [No. 1] and 
Article 3 of the Hours of Work [Commerce and Offices] Convention, 1930 
[No. 30]). In connection to limitations on daily working hours, it is 
important to note that no international labor standard protects the right to 
regular, minimum rest breaks during the working day (International Labour 
Office, 2011, p. 70). Short periods of rest have a significant effect on the 
well-being of the worker.  
These limitations on daily and weekly hours of work were adopted to 
protect workers’ health and to hinder that unhealthy working hours were 
used increase profitability (Messenger, 2006, p. 420). Today, the 48-hour 
working week is no longer the global standard, though it is still prevalent in 
South America and Asia (Evain, 2008, p. 10). A majority of ILO member 
states have adopted national legislation that prescribes a lower limit on the 
normal working hours per week (Lee et al., 2007, p. 12).  
These instruments also regulate overtime. According to these 
conventions, workers are entitled to a pay increase of at least 25 percent 
during overtime work. The worker must receive information on the number 
of hours of overtime required. Conventions Nos. 1 and 30 do not specify a 
maximum limit on overtime work but according to the Committee of 
Experts, periods of overtime work must be ‘reasonable, so as not to 
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jeopardize the principle of limiting working hours’ (International Labour 
Office, 2011, p. 10). 
In 1935, the 40-hour working week was established as the ILO’s vision 
of acceptable hours of work in the Forty-Hour Week Convention, 1935 (No. 
47). The reduced hours were originally motived by high rates of 
unemployment in the 1930s (Preamble of Forty-Hour Week Convention, 
1935 [No. 47]). Today, this lower standard is also motivated by other 
factors, such as a fair balance between work and family life (McCann, 2004, 
p. 11). The Reduction of Hours of Work Recommendation, 1962 (No. 116) 
reinforced the 40-hour working week as ‘a social standard to be reached by 
stages if necessary’ in the Preamble.  Today, more than 40 percent of 
countries have adopted this standard. Most are high-income nations, though 
the 40-hour week is also prevalent in Central and Eastern Europe as well as 
Africa (Evain, 2008, p. 9).    
International labor standards have also been adopted on the subject of 
night work. One of the first international instruments of the ILO banned 
night work for women in industrial undertakings (Article 3 of the Night 
Work [Women] Convention, 1919 [No. 4]). The current Night Work 
Convention (No. 171) from 1990 does not prohibit either women or men to 
work during the night, but requires that specific measures are taken to 
protect these workers. Women who are pregnant or have recently given birth 
shall be given alternative hours of work (Article 7). Night work is defined as 
‘work performed during a period of not less than seven consecutive hours, 
including the interval from midnight to 5 a.m.’ (Article 1). 
The ILO has also adopted conventions and recommendations on weekly 
rest. The general standard of twenty-four consecutive hours of rest every 
seven days has been established for industrial workers as well as office and 
commerce employees in two conventions (Article 2.1 of the Weekly Rest 
[Industry] Convention, 1921 [No. 14], and Article 6.1 of the Weekly Rest 
[Commerce and Offices] Convention, 1957 [No. 106]). The period of rest 
shall, whenever possible, ‘be granted simultaneously to the whole of the 
staff of the industrial or commercial undertaking’ and ‘coincide with the 
days already established by the traditions or customs of the country in 
question’ (Articles 2.2 and 2.3 of the Weekly Rest [Industry] Convention, 
1921 (No. 14), and Article 6.2 and 6.3 of the Weekly Rest [Commerce and 
Offices] Convention, 1957 [No. 106]). According to comments by the 
Committee of Experts, the principles of ‘regularity, continuity and 
uniformity’ capture the requirements on weekly rest in the two conventions 
(International Labour Office, 2011, p. 12).  
On the topic of longer periods of rest and recreation, employees are 
awarded three working weeks of paid holiday per year by the Holidays with 
Pay Convention (Revised), 1970 (No. 132). The minimum rules on paid 
holiday are mandatory, due to the fundamental need to protect workers’ 
right to rest (International Labour Office, 2011, p. 13). Workers cannot 
relinquish their right to paid annual leave. 
The legal parameters of decent work set by ILO conventions are 
minimum standards. They are also used to assess the progress of countries 
in the realization of decent working time. National legal norms on 
maximum hours of work and paid annual leave are legal framework 
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indicators of use in such assessments (International Labour Office, 2013b). 
Ratifications of important conventions are also relevant indicators.  
2.2.2 Further Parameters of Decent Working 
Time 
To advance the concept of decent working time beyond the limits set by 
international labor standards, the ILO has proposed five additional 
dimensions of decent working time, based on research on working time 
trends in the industrialized world (Boulin et al., 2006, p. 20). These 
parameters are healthy working time, family-friendly working time, gender 
equality through working time, productive working time, and choice and 
influence regarding working time (ibid., p. 25). Anxo et al. (2004a, p. 7) 
acknowledge the problems with adopting a general definition of decent 
working time based on the needs and preferences of an average worker, 
since the definition of decent working hours and adequate free time is likely 
to depend on the specific concerns of the individual worker at different 
stages of their life. However, these parameters represent ‘the most 
significant dimensions of decent working time’ and provide a ‘broad policy 
framework from which to consider’ how decent working time for all can be 
achieved (Anxo et al., 2004b, p. 195, Boulin et al., 2006, p. 26). 
Healthy working time is an essential dimension of decent working time. 
The early conventions adopted on working time were aimed at protecting 
the health of the employees (Messenger, 2006, p. 420). International labor 
standards have been drafted to hinder employers from using unhealthy 
working hours to increase their profitability (ibid.). Legislation that restricts 
paid overtime is still of importance, as regular use of overtime can become a 
‘cost-saving strategy’ for employers who avoid the cost of expanding their 
workforce by extending the hours of work for their employees (ibid., p. 
422). Frequent overtime can also create a dependence on the extra income 
for the workers.  
Long working days and night work pose a threat to workers’ well-being. 
Medical research shows that working time beyond fifty hours per week has 
negative health effects (Anxo et al., 2004b, p. 196).  Depending on the 
nature of the work, fatigue caused by long hours of work may also pose a 
threat to the safety of others (Messenger, 2006, p. 421). The health effects of 
long hours of work have historically been a central concern in the adoption 
of international labor standards on work time and is an important dimension 
of today’s discussion on how to realize decent working time.     
Family-friendly working time is another dimension of decent working 
hours.  The need to balance the hours at work with family life has not 
always been a concern in international labor standards or national law. The 
workplace has traditionally been treated as a ‘discrete and bound sphere of 
social and economic activity in which its participants are fully and 
exclusively engaged’ (McCann, 2004, p. 15). Today, work-family balance is 
frequently discussed in many high-income nations. Fudge (2005, p. 261) 
views the growing importance of work-life balance as a result of the recent 
dissolution of the traditional gender contract, which stipulates that the man 
is engaged in waged labor while the woman performs reproductive work at 
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home. Family-friendly working time has become increasingly important 
because of the growing numbers of women on the labor market. As the 
traditional division of tasks changes, the hours at work must be organized to 
resolve the conflict between work and family life. 
The need to adapt working hours to family life is not equally recognized 
around the world (Lee et al, 2007, p. 3). In low- and middle-income states, 
the discussion on family-friendly working hours is not as frequent as in 
high-income nations. This should not be taken as indicative of fewer 
problems related to work-family balance. The conflict between work and 
family responsibilities is commonly resolved through ‘gender-biased 
informal employment’ or ‘extended family support’ in these nations (Lee et 
al., 2007, p. 4). This dimension of working hours, i.e. the possibility to 
combine work and family life for all workers, is in varying need of attention 
in different parts of the world. It is a central component of the process 
towards decent working time.  
Decent working time also requires working hours to be organized for the 
advancement of gender equality. The promotion of gender equality is an 
overarching objective of the Decent Work Agenda. It must also be a key 
consideration in the development of working time standards (Anxo et al., 
2004b, p. 202). If this is not recognized as an integral part of any measure 
taken on working time, labor market policies aimed at the realization of 
decent working time might increase gender inequality (ibid., pp. 202–203). 
For example, flexible working time arrangements might increase the 
employee’s influence over their hours of work but could also reinforce 
‘gender-based labour market segregation’ (McCann, 2004, p. 13). Part-time 
work in high-income countries is usually low-status and low-paid work. 
Employment of this character is usually found in female-dominated sectors, 
due to the ability to combine part–time work with care responsibilities. As a 
result, women often are stuck in low-paid work. In contrast, many high-
status jobs require long hours of work. This effectively keeps women with 
care responsibilities out of this type of employment. In addition, men, who 
usually occupy these positions, are less able to partake in family life and 
domestic work (ibid., p. 15). As this example shows, policies that serve 
other dimensions of decent working time must also further gender equality 
for the realization of decent work for all.   
The fourth dimension of decent working time is based on the need for 
productivity during working hours. This is related to the need for healthy 
working hours, as lengthy working days affects the wellness of the workers 
and thus hampers his or her productivity (Anxo et al., 2004b, p. 205).  
Research suggests that shorter work days also lead to increased productivity, 
not only because of the physical well-being of the employees, but because 
of better attitudes and morale among staff (ibid., p. 206). Productive 
working time should be of interest to the employer, as it leads to increased 
efficiency (ibid., p. 207). The significant effect it has on the well-being of 
the employee makes it an important dimension of decent working time.  
A fifth parameter of decent work is the right of the worker to choose and 
influence their hours of work. Traditionally, rigid working time 
arrangements have dominated the formal labor market (McCann, 2004, p. 
11–12). Today, flexibility has become a central concept in the discussion on 
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working time, especially in Europe. However, as Anxo et al (2004a, p. 3) 
point out, measures taken to increase flexibility do not always benefit 
workers, but are implemented to remove ‘restrictions on unsocial hours’ that 
have been enforced to protect the health of employees. Still, policies that 
successfully further worker choice without hampering other dimensions of 
decent work could improve work-family balance (McCann, 2004, p. 16). 
According to McCann (ibid.) such legislation could potentially decrease 
gender inequality by making shorter working days more prevalent. This 
would allow women to decrease the working hours in their current jobs, 
instead of being forced to seek out traditionally low-paid part-time work. 
Choice over working hours could facilitate women’s participation on the 
labor market and allow for men to organize their work around the needs of 
their family. In addition, influence over working time – ‘the exercise of 
choice’ – is an important factor to increase productivity (Anxo et al., 2004b, 
p. 207).  
2.3 Working Time in Other Human Rights 
Instruments  
In addition to the research and standard-setting activities of the ILO, decent 
working time is a matter of concern for other international actors. The right 
to a reasonable limitation on working hours is frequently found in human 
rights instruments at international and regional levels. 
At the international level, the right to reasonable working hours is 
established in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR), 
generally viewed as the foundation of human rights law. Article 24 states 
that ‘everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable 
limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.’ Furthermore, 
this right is included in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly in 1966. State parties are legally bound by the Covenant to 
recognize the ‘right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable 
conditions of work’ (Article 7). Particular attention shall be given to ‘[r]est, 
leisure and reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays 
with pay, as well as remuneration for public holidays’ (Article 7 d). The 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families (MWC) states that ‘migrant 
workers shall enjoy treatment not less favourable than that which applies to 
nationals of the State of employment in respect of … overtime, hours of 
work, weekly rest, [and] holidays with pay’ (Article 25 a).  
Furthermore, norms on working hours are often found in human rights 
instruments adopted at the regional level by intergovernmental 
organizations. The European Social Charter, adopted by the Council of 
Europe in 1961 to complement the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms and revised in 1996, requires the Parties to, 
inter alia,  ‘undertake to provide for reasonable daily and weekly working 
hours, the working week to be progressively reduced to the extent that the 
increase of productivity and other relevant factors permit’ and ‘to ensure a 
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weekly rest period which shall, as far as possible, coincide with the day 
recognized by tradition or custom in the country or region concerned as a 
day of rest’ (Articles 2.1 and 2.5 of the European Social Charter). In the 
European Union, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
awards every worker the right to ‘limitation of maximum working hours, to 
daily and weekly rest periods and to an annual period of paid leave’ as well 
as ‘working conditions which respect his or her health, safety and dignity’ 
(Article 31). Since the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force in 2009, this 
Charter has full legal effect. Similar provisions are found in human 
instruments of the Organization of American States. The state parties to the 
Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the 
Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – the Protocol of San 
Salvador – recognize the right to work under ‘just, equitable, and 
satisfactory conditions … particularly with respect to …. reasonable 
limitation of working hours, both daily and weekly. The days shall be 
shorter in the case of dangerous or unhealthy work or of night work’ 
(Article 7). The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration also acknowledges the 
right to ‘just, decent and favourable conditions of work’ (Article 27.1).  
In addition to these universal and regional human rights standards on 
reasonable limitations to working hours, decent work has become a central 
concept in the international development agenda. ‘Full and productive 
employment and decent work for all’ is one of eight Millennium 
Development Goals established by world leaders after the Millennium 
Summit in 2000 to guide the international development work (Target 1.B). 
Decent work for all is viewed as a step to eradicate extreme poverty and 
hunger. This entails the idea of decent working time. These treaties show 
that working time is not just a concern of the ILO but a central concept in 
the international human rights sphere.  
2.4 Decent Working Time for Domestic 
Workers in International Law 
2.4.1 Domestic Work and the Informal Economy 
A central challenge in regulating for decent working conditions in domestic 
work is the prevalence of informality: these workers constitute a significant 
portion of the informal economy, characterized by ‘de jure or de facto non-
recognition’ in national labor law (Teklè, 2010, p. 15).  
There is not a universally accepted definition of the term, due to the great 
diversity of ‘workers, enterprises and entrepreneurs with identifiable 
characteristics’ in the informal economy (International Labour Organization, 
2002, pp. 5–6). The informal economy includes ‘all economic activities by 
workers and economic units that are – in law or in practice – not covered or 
insufficiently covered by formal arrangements’ (ibid.).  
Informal work is particularly prevalent in the South, where a ‘great part 
of the active populations has never performed work that corresponds to the 
industrial employment model around which “conventional” labour law 
protection is shaped’ (Teklè, 2010, p. 13). The informal economy is 
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dominated by the ‘most vulnerable and marginalized groups’ in society due 
to discrimination on the bases of gender, age, ethnicity and disability 
(International Labour Organization, 2002, p. 8). Accordingly, more women 
than men work in the informal economy. 
The aim of the Decent Work Agenda is to promote decent work for 
everyone. A core principle of the Agenda is that ‘all those who work have 
rights at work’ (International Labour Office, 1999, p. 3). The mandate of the 
ILO goes beyond the needs of workers in formal enterprises: the work of the 
Organization must also address ‘workers beyond the formal labour market – 
with unregulated wage workers, the self-employed, and homeworker’ 
(International Labour Office, 1999, pp. 3–4). The workers in the informal 
economy outnumber those in formal employment (International Labour 
Organization, 2002, pp. 5–6). In 2002, the Governing Body adopted a 
resolution concerning decent work and the informal economy to address the 
decent work deficit for these workers. The resolution concludes that 
informality is ‘principally a governance issue’:  
‘The growth of the informal economy can often be traced to 
inappropriate, ineffective, misguided or badly implemented 
macroeconomic and social policies, often developed without tripartite 
consultation; the lack of conducive legal and institutional frameworks; 
and the lack of good governance for proper and effective 
implementation of policies and laws’ (International Labour 
Organization, 2002, p. 7).  
In recent decades, the need to extend decent working conditions to the 
informal economy as gained recognition within the ILO. In June 2014, the 
103rd Session of the International Labour Conference will discuss the 
‘facilitating transitions from the informal to the formal economy’ with the aim 
to adopt a Recommendation on this subject (International Labour Conference, 
2013, pp. 1–2). 
2.4.2 Application of International Labor 
Standards on Working Time 
Many international labor standards apply to domestic work. These workers 
enjoy formal protection of their fundamental principles and rights at work, 
e.g. freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining. They are 
also protected by standards on the rights of migrant workers (European 
Trade Union Confederation, 2005, p. 50). In general, domestic workers are 
covered by international standards unless the instrument explicitly excludes 
them (International Labour Conference, 2010, p. 16). The ILO has actively 
taken steps to ensure that domestic workers are not unintentionally excluded 
from the scope of labor standards, for example by adopting definitions of 
concepts that are wide enough to cover domestic workers (ibid.). Still, 
international protection of these workers has traditionally been weak, 
especially with regards to hours of work. 
Several conventions on working time do not apply to domestic work. The 
Hours of Work (Industry) Convention, 1919 (No. 1) and Hours of Work 
(Commerce and Offices) Convention, 1930 (No. 30), which set the length of 
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the standard working week to 48 hours, are not applicable to domestic 
workers (Article 1). Nor do the two conventions awarding workers in the 
industry as well as commerce and offices twenty-four consecutive hours of 
weekly rest apply to this group of workers (Article 2 of the Weekly Rest 
[Industry] Convention, 1921 [No. 14], Articles 2–3 of the Weekly Rest 
[Commerce and Offices] Convention, 1957 [No. 106]). In other instruments 
on working time, domestic workers are not explicitly excluded from the 
scope of the conventions, though many standards contain provisions that 
allow for the exclusion of categories of employees ‘in respect of whose 
employment special problems of a substantial nature, relating to 
enforcement or to legislative or constitutional matters, arise’ (Article 2 of 
the Holidays with Pay Convention [Revised], 1970 [No. 132]). When 
conventions allow for the exclusion of categories of workers from the scope 
of the instrument, such exclusions require consultation with trade unions 
and employers’ organizations. Consequently, domestic workers are 
dependent on workers’ organization to ensure that they are not excluded 
from the scope of labor instruments (European Trade Union Confederation, 
2005, p. 50). In addition, the often informal character of domestic work 
leads to these workers being ‘excluded de facto from formal regulations’ 
(International Labour Conference, 2010, p. 11).  
2.4.3 The Convention concerning Decent Work 
for Domestic Workers, 2011 (No. 189) and 
Recommendation (No. 201)  
In 2011, the International Labour Conference adopted the Convention 
concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers, 2011 (No. 189) and 
Recommendation, (No. 201) on the working conditions for domestic 
workers. The purpose of this instrument is to ‘reaffirm the international 
protections to which domestic workers are already entitled’ and establish 
new rights for these workers (International Labour Conference, 2010, p. 96). 
The convention was adopted to extend the labor protection awarded other 
categories of worker to include domestic workers. Exemption of domestic 
workers from labor regulation on working time is common practice and 
often motivated by the ‘“distinctive work pattern” and the “exceptional 
nature” of domestic work that is held to make it unsuitable for regulation’ 
(International Labour Office, 2013a, p. 59). The convention creates a 
general obligation on state parties to ensure decent working conditions for 
domestic workers (Article 6). This includes, for example, the right to 
privacy for live-in workers. The state parties may ‘exclude wholly or partly’ 
from the scope of the convention categories of workers who are ‘otherwise 
provided with at least equivalent protection’ or workers ‘in respect of which 
special problems of a substantial nature arise’ (Article 2). 
To preserve and protect the dimension of these workers’ lives that is 
‘distinct from their engagement in waged labour’, the Domestic Workers 
Convention, 2011 (No. 189), requires state parties to implement ‘measures 
towards ensuring equal treatment between domestic workers and workers 
generally in relation to normal hours of work, overtime compensation, 
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periods of daily and weekly rest and paid annual leave’ (Article 10). The 
call for equal treatment with respect to normal working hours is based on 
the fact that almost all countries have a limit on weekly working hours, 
usually between 40 and 48 hours (International Labour Office, 2013a, p. 
60). The problem is therefore not a lack of legislation in this area, but the 
exemption of domestic workers from its scope (ibid.).  
Another component of working time is the right to weekly rest. Article 
10 calls for 24 consecutive hours of weekly rest for domestic workers (para. 
2). This is equal to the rest period awarded other workers by the Weekly 
Rest (Industry) Convention, 1921 (No. 14), and the Weekly Rest 
(Commerce and Offices) Convention, 1957 (No. 106). Statistics show that 
‘44.9 percent of all domestic workers, or 23.6 million worldwide, are not 
entitled to any weekly rest under national legislation’ (International Labour 
Office, 2013a, p. 62). Weekly rest is seen as pivotal to ‘preserve domestic 
workers’ health and safety and enable them to spend time with their 
families’ (ibid.). 
Article 10 of the Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189) also 
requires equal treatment of domestic workers in the area of annual paid 
leave. As discussed above, all employed persons are entitled to a minimum 
of three weeks of paid leave annually (the Holidays with Pay Convention 
[Revised], 1970 [No. 132]). Domestic workers are covered by the legislation 
on annual leave in many member states:  almost 50 percent of all domestic 
workers enjoy the same entitlements to annual leave as other workers 
(International Labour Office, 2013a, p. 64). The Domestic Workers 
Convention calls for equal treatment of domestic workers in this area, to 
guarantee the overall well-being of these employees. The right to paid 
annual leave is especially significant for migrant workers with family in 
another country who ‘depend on their paid holidays to be able to reunite 
with them’ (ibid.). Live-in workers are also dependent on the right to annual 
leave. The right to paid annual leave is especially weak in Asia, where only 
3 percent of domestic workers enjoy legal protection of this right (ibid., p. 
65). Other workers are wholly dependent on the discretion of their 
employer. 
The Domestic Workers Convention reaffirms protection offered by 
existing instruments and creates new standards of protection for these 
fundamental aspects of working time, which are crucial to address to 
achieve decent working time for domestic workers. The convention entered 
into force on September 5, 2013. The ratification process was spurred on by 
the ‘12 by 12’ campaign, initiated by the International Trade Union 
Confederation in partnership with, among others, the International Domestic 
Worker Network, to achieve 12 ratifications of the convention in 2012.  
Today, 14 countries have ratified the convention, a majority of these in 
South America. The Philippines, a major country of origin for migrant 
domestic workers, is the only Asian country that has ratified the instrument. 
Two European nations are parties to the Convention: Italy and Germany.  
 
 23 
3 Domestic Work and Working 
Time Regulation in Thailand  
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the fundamental characteristics of 
the labor law system in Thailand, focusing especially on working time 
legislation. This chapter also examines the characteristics of domestic work 
in Thailand and the applicability of national working time regulation to this 
type of work. 
3.1 Fundamental Characteristics of the 
Labor Law System of Thailand  
The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand is the fundamental instrument 
for governance and provides the basis for rule of law. It governs the rights 
and duties of the government as well as of the people. However, the 
Constitution has not always protected fundamental rights and freedoms. 
Frequent constitutional reforms have impaired its status as supreme 
guarantor of human rights (Yoshida, 2003, p. 354). The 1932 Constitution 
of the Democratic Kingdom of Thailand established parliamentary 
democracy as the form of government. Since its adoption, however, the 
country has been plagued by coup d’états. A large number of constitutions 
have been passed since 1932 – the most recent Constitution of 2007 is the 
eighteenth in order. Military dictators have repeatedly redrafted the 
constitution to assert their political power, often resulting in the effective 
repression of civil and political rights.  Every change of government has led 
to ‘the dissolution of trade unions, prohibition of industrial action and 
abolition of labour law’ (ibid., p. 353).  
The development of labor rights in Thailand has also been hampered by 
the country’s socio-economic situation. Yoshida (2003, p. 353) points out 
how Thailand in the 1970s, like many low-income nations, adopted a system 
restricting ‘fundamental human rights’ and ‘public participation in politics’ 
in favor of economic development. By constraining workers’ rights, the cost 
of labor could be reduced. This helped create a legal system with heavily 
restricted labor rights.  
In the 1990s, the political climate was changing. By now, Thailand had 
transformed into a middle-income nation with a growing middle class 
demanding fundamental rights and democratic governance (Dressel, 2009, 
p. 297). In 1997, a new constitution was adopted. The 1997 People’s 
Constitution has been described as a ‘watershed event’ in the constitutional 
history of Thailand, due to the extensive participation of the public in the 
drafting process (ibid., pp. 296–301). The redrafting of the Constitution was 
not prompted by a coup d’état. Rather, it was a conscious attempt of the 
government to move towards democratic governance (Yoshida, 2003, p. 
353). The current constitution was adopted in 2007, prompted by the 2006 
coup d’état by the Royal Thai Army to oust publically elected Prime 
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Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (Dressel, 2009, p. 297). Although the process 
of drafting the new constitution involved little participation by the public, 
the rights and liberties established by the 1997 Constitution are largely 
intact (ibid., p. 312).  
Fundamental labor rights are enshrined in the Constitution as individual 
freedoms. Section 63 protects the freedom of peaceful assembly. 
Limitations are set up in the second paragraph, which stipulates that this 
liberty may be restricted by ‘virtue of law specifically enacted’ to maintain 
public order or during a state of emergency. Section 64 safeguards freedom 
of association, which may only be restricted by legislation to protect certain 
fundamental aims such as ‘public order or good morals’.  
Before labor-related rights and freedoms were protected by the 
Constitution, labor relations were regulated by the Civil and Commercial 
Code, last amended in 2008 (No.18, B.E. 2551) (Yoshida, 2003, p. 352). 
The first labor-related provisions were introduced in 1929 when Book III on 
contract law was adopted. Sections 575–586 under Title VI on the hire of 
services are of importance for labor-related issues. These Sections govern, 
for example, the right to remuneration. The applicability of this Code is 
established by Section 14 of Labour Protection Act (LPA) (1998), the 
fundamental statute on labor protection in the Thai legal system 
(International Labour Office, 2013c, p. 4). The LPA regulates terms and 
conditions of work. It was passed to align national labor norms with 
international labor standards and ‘improve the quality of labor’, which had 
suffered under Thailand’s restrictive policies during its phase of economic 
growth (ibid., p. 357.). Wages and working hours, as well as occupational 
safety and other basic labor rights, are regulated in the LPA. The Minister of 
Labour and Social Welfare may alter the provisions of the LPA by issuing 
of Ministerial Regulations (Section 6). 
Another statute of fundamental importance is the Labour Relations Act, 
B.E. 2518 (LRA) (1975). This Act regulates the right of workers and 
employers to establish associations.
 
A trade union shall promote 
understanding between workers and their employer, and protect the interests 
of employees with reference to working conditions (Section 86). According 
to Chapter VII, a trade union may be set up after an application has been 
submitted by ten employees of Thai nationality who share same employer or 
line of work (Sections 88–89). Membership in a union can be sought by any 
other employee of the same employer or in the same trade, except 
supervisors (Section 95). Thai nationality is not required for union 
membership, but migrant workers are not eligible to be part of the 
leadership of a workers’ organization (Section 100). This restriction on the 
freedom of association of migrant workers is not in compliance with the 
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise 
Convention, 1948 (No. 87) (Human Rights Watch, 2010, p. 80).  
Trade unions have the power to negotiate and ‘enter into agreements with 
the employer or employers’ association’ (Section 98). Collective bargaining 
on enterprise level is the dominant form of collective bargaining in Thailand 
(Yoon, 2009, p.14). As a result, the effect of collective agreements is limited 
to the individual firms. In Thailand, the percentage of workers covered by 
collective agreements is lower than the percentage of organized workers. In 
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2010, 3.6 percent of workers were union members, according to the 
ILOSTAT database. 
Labor disputes are handled by the Labour Court, whose activities are 
regulated by the Labour Court Establishment and Procedures Act, B.E. 2522 
(1979). The first national Labour Court was established in 1980. The Court 
consists of professional judges as well as lay judges who represent the 
employers and the employees. Disputes commonly concern ‘unfair 
dismissal, severance pay and claims for other benefits’. To file a complaint 
with the Labour Court is a popular means to resolve disputes for employees. 
Due to the low rate of unionization, trade unions are generally unable to 
effectively resolve labor disputes for their members (Yoshida, 2003, p. 360–
361). 
In addition to national legislation, international law influences the 
standards of the Thai labor system. Thailand is one of twenty-nine founder 
members of the International Labour Organization. However, the country 
has ratified a limited number of conventions, only fifteen in total. Thailand 
has ratified five of the eight core conventions on fundamental principles and 
rights at work. Neither the Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organize Convention, 1948 (No. 87), nor the Right to Organize and 
Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98) is ratified by the country. 
Thailand has ratified one – the Employment Policy Convention, 1964 (No. 
122) – of the four prioritized governance conventions on subjects such as 
labor inspection and tripartite consultation, identified by the ILO as key 
instruments in a functioning labor standard system. 
Thailand has ratified nine of the 177 technical conventions adopted by 
the ILO. Eight of these are in force. Of the numerous conventions on 
working time, Thailand has ratified the Weekly Rest (Industry) Convention, 
1921 (No. 14). Thailand has not ratified the newly adopted Convention 
concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers, 2011 (No. 189) and 
Recommendation (No. 201). There are currently no indications that the 
government will ratify this convention.  
Due to the limited number of ratifications, Thailand is bound by few 
international labor standards. As explained above, however, any member of 
the ILO is bound by an obligation to ‘promote and realize’ the core 
principles laid out in Article 2 of the ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work from 1998, namely the ‘freedom of 
association and the effective recognition of the right to collective 
bargaining, the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor, the 
effective abolition of child labor, and the elimination of discrimination in 
respect of employment and occupation’. 
3.2 Characteristics of Domestic Work   
3.2.1 Prevalence of Domestic Work and 
Composition of the Workforce 
More than a quarter of a million domestic workers are estimated to be 
employed in Thailand (International Labour Office, 2013c, p. 1). According 
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to the World Bank, the total labor force in the country is 39 million. Due to 
the rapid economic growth in recent decades, the middle class in Thailand is 
rapidly expanding. Women have gained access to further education as well 
as formal work. Today, labor force participation of women in Thailand is 60 
percent (Yoshida, 2003, p. 350). Domestic workers are often employed to 
alleviate the burden of care responsibilities in a society with limited public 
welfare. They are hired to perform a multitude of tasks, including cleaning, 
cooking, caring for children and elderly, as well as any other task requested 
by their employer. Caretakers for children and elders are increasingly in 
demand Thai society (Boonitand, 2010, p. 3).  
A study by Chulalongkorn University’s Social Research Institute from 
2008 indicates that women dominate the workforce in domestic work –  
about 84 percent of domestic workers are female (Boonitand, 2010, pp. 8–
9). As Thai women reject employment in the domestic service sector in 
favor of industrial jobs, migrant workers from neighboring countries are 
employed as domestic workers (Foundation for Labour and Employment 
Promotion 2012, p. 4). According to the Foundation for Labour and 
Employment Promotion (HomeNet Thailand), 90 percent of domestic 
workers in Thailand are migrant workers, predominantly from Burma, Laos 
and Cambodia. Though there are regular channels for labor migration, a 
majority of these workers have irregular status (Foundation for Labour and 
Employment Promotion 2012, p. 4). 
3.2.2 The Employment Relationship  
Domestic workers have long lacked recognition as employees by the 
authorities and in society at large. Until recently, domestic work was 
defined as informal work by the Ministry of Labour (Boonitand, 2010, p. 4). 
Workers in the informal economy are excluded from the scope of ’existing 
workplace laws, regulations and protections’, according to the definition by 
the National Statistics Office (Kelly et al., 2010, pp. 376-377). Due to 
changes in Thailand’s national labor legislation, certain conditions of work 
for domestic workers are now regulated by law. 
The view on domestic work as something other than work prevails 
despite the recent legislative changes. As a result, the rights and duties of 
the two parties to the employment relationship are seldom regulated in a 
formal contract. Instead, the employment relationship is often casual, based 
on ‘kinship or personal or social relations’: domestic workers often find 
work through recommendations of friends or relatives (Kelly et al., pp. 376-
377). Domestic workers may also find work via private agencies. A 
contractual agreement that specifies, inter alia, specific tasks, salary, and 
annual leave may be established between the agency, the employer and the 
employee (Boontinand, 2010, p. 11). A contract may also be established 
directly between worker and employer.  
Frequently, however, no contractual agreement exists between the 
parties. According to a study by the Federation of Trade Unions Burma on 
the working conditions of Burmese migrant workers in Bangkok, only two 
of the 409 interviewed employees had a mutual agreement with their 
employer on ‘tasks, wages, and working conditions’ (2013, p. 14). In both 
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cases, the agreement was verbal. According to Section 5 of the LPA, an 
employment contract may be concluded orally or in writing. Domestic 
workers report that discussions with their employers mainly focus on their 
tasks and wages, rather than conditions such as working time (Federation of 
Trade Unions in Burma, 2013, p. 15). 
Domestic workers are categorized as either live-in or live-out workers. 
Live-in workers usually receive food and accommodation from their 
employer. There are various reasons for a live-in arrangement:  
‘These workers generally do not hail from the neighboring town. They 
prefer a live-in arrangement because they do not have an alternative 
home in the vicinity. Sometimes they want a live-in arrangement to 
save the cost of housing. At other times they must accept a live-in 
arrangement because that is what the employers demand. … In the 
case of undocumented migrants, a live-in arrangement is also an 
asylum of some sorts, albeit a fragile one, from the immigration 
authorities’ (Mundlak, 2005, p. 141).   
According to the survey on working conditions of Burmese migrant 
domestic workers, over 90 percent of were live-in workers (Federation of 
Trade Unions in Burma, 2013, p. 15). A majority of these workers cited free 
food and accommodation as the reason for this arrangement (ibid., p. 9).  
In contrast to live-in workers, live-out workers are not living with their 
employer. The living arrangement does not affect the status of the worker as 
employee, as defined in Section 5 of the LPA as ‘a person who is employed 
by an employer for remuneration, regardless of the title he is given’. 
Regardless of living arrangement, working conditions in domestic work 
must adhere to the standards established by national labor legislation.  
3.3 The National Regulation of Working 
Time for Domestic Work  
The Labour Protection Act, B.E. 2541 (1998) (LPA) is the central statute on 
working conditions. It was implemented with the aim to align national labor 
norms with the standards set by ratified ILO conventions (Yoshida, 2003, p. 
358). The 16 chapters of the LPA regulate, inter alia, termination of 
employment, wages, and occupational safety and health. Chapter 2 
(Employment of Labour in General) of the Act contains provisions on hours 
of work, holidays, overtime and rest periods.  
Section 4 of the LPA stipulates that any category of employer may be 
completely or partially excluded from the scope of application of the LPA 
through a Ministerial Regulation. Alongside the adoption of the LPA in 
1998, Ministerial Regulation, B.E. 2541 was issued to render many of the 
provisions of the new Act inapplicable to ‘employers employing workers to 
perform domestic work which does not involve business operations’. 
Domestic workers had long suffered from insufficient protection of their 
working conditions: they were neither explicitly excluded nor included in 
the wording of national labor legislation and domestic work has traditionally 
been regarded as something other than work. The 1998 Ministerial 
Regulation constituted an explicit exclusion of domestic workers from the 
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scope of the provisions on working time in Chapter 2 of the LPA. 
Limitations to daily and weekly working hours were not applicable to 
domestic work (Section 23), nor were these workers entitled to weekly and 
annual periods of rest by law (Sections 28–30).   
The protection of decent working conditions in domestic work has 
recently improved. In 2012, the government introduced a new Ministerial 
Regulation No. 14, B.E. 2555, under the Labour Protection Act. This 
Regulation was issued to replace the 1998 Ministerial Regulation, as the 
protection awarded domestic workers under this Regulation did ‘not respond 
to the changed social and economic conditions’ in present day Thailand 
(Royal Thai Government Gazette, 2012).  
As a result of the 2012 Ministerial Regulation, Sections 28–30 of the 
LPA are now applicable to domestic work. The right to weekly rest and 
annual leave for domestic workers is now protected by law.  
Paragraph 1 of Section 28 stipulates that an employee shall have ‘at least 
one day off per week’. The interval between each weekly holiday cannot 
exceed six days. Under some circumstances, weekly holidays may be 
accumulated and taken at a later time. Accumulated holidays must be taken 
within a period of four weeks.   
Annual leave is awarded the employee as traditional and annual holidays. 
Employees are granted at least thirteen traditional holidays annually, which 
the employer ‘shall consider’ to distribute in accordance with ‘government, 
religious or local customary holidays’ (Section 29, para. 2). If this is not 
possible, due to the nature of the work or limitations set out in a Ministerial 
Regulation for example, the worker shall receive holiday pay at the rate 
prescribed by law or another day off in substitute.  
In addition to traditional holidays, employees who fulfil certain criteria 
are entitled to annual holidays: workers who have been employed for twelve 
consecutive months are entitled to at least six weekdays of holiday (Section 
30). Annual holidays can be accumulated and postponed. 
Although the protection and regulation of decent working time for 
domestic workers have improved in recent years, this group of workers is 
still excluded from the scope of central provisions on working time.  
There is no maximum limit on daily or weekly working hours for 
domestic workers. For other categories of employees, this is regulated in 
Section 23 of the LPA. The general rule on working hours stipulates that 
‘the number of working hours in one day shall not exceed eight and the total 
number of working hours in one week shall not exceed 48 hours’.  If the 
work ‘may be harmful to the health and safety’ of the worker, daily hours of 
work ‘shall not exceed seven’ and weekly hours of work shall not exceed 
42. In addition, this Section requires employers to inform the worker of 
‘starting and finishing times for each working day’. If this cannot be 
specified because of ‘the nature or type of work’, the two parties must agree 
on a fixed number of working hours per day and week that does not exceed 
eight and 48 hours, respectively.  
Domestic workers are excluded from the scope of provisions on overtime 
and holiday working hours. Section 24 prohibits an employer from 
‘requiring an employee to work overtime on a normal working day’, except 
when prior consent of the employee has been obtained (para. 1). However, 
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such requirements are not unlawful if there is a risk that ‘damage could be 
caused’ or the work is of ‘an urgent nature’ as prescribed by Ministerial 
Regulations (para. 2). Under these circumstances, an employee is required 
to work overtime ‘as necessary’. An employer cannot require an employee 
to work on a holiday, as stipulated by Section 25. This Section contains an 
exception to this rule, if ‘damage could be caused or the work is of ‘an 
urgent nature’ (para. 1). According to paragraph 2 of Section 25, certain 
categories of employees are excluded from the scope of the general 
prohibition on holiday work. These include those employed in the 
hospitality industry and medical staff. Ministerial Regulations may prescribe 
further limitations to the application of the prohibition of holiday work. In 
addition, an employee who has given prior consent to work on a holiday can 
be required to do so if necessary in the ‘interests of production, distribution 
or the provision of a service’ (para. 3). Ministerial Regulation No. 3, B.E. 
2541, under the Labour Protection Act stipulates that the number of hours of 
overtime referred to in the first paragraph of Section 24 and holiday working 
hours referred to in the second and third paragraphs of Section 25, shall not 
exceed 36 hours ‘in any one week’. 
The right to daily rest periods in domestic work is not protected by the 
LPA. Other employers are required by Section 27 to allow for rest periods 
during the working day. An employee must be allowed at least one hour of 
rest after five consecutive hours of work. The two parties may agree in 
advance to limit or delay the period of rest, as long as it is equal to or longer 
than one hour in total per working day. Such agreement between employer 
and employee is only valid if it is ‘beneficial to the employee’, according to 
paragraph 2. Paragraph 3 stipulates that periods of rest are not to be viewed 
as working time. In similarity with other provisions on working time, the 
limitations in paragraphs 1 and 4 of Section 27 can be evaded if the 
employee consents to a different solution, or in case of emergency.  
Provisions in Chapter 2 of the LPA regulate central parameters of decent 
working time, such as daily and weekly hours of work, weekly rest, and the 
right to annual leave. These were adopted to align national legislation with 
international standards on working time. As domestic workers are excluded 
from the scope of certain provisions on working time, the right to decent 
working time for this group of workers is not protected to the same extent as 
other employees’. Case law to complement statutory norms on working time 
in domestic work is non-existent: complaints regarding violations of 
working time limitations for domestic workers have yet to reach the 
competent authorities (interview with Poonsap Tulaphan, manager at 
HomeNet, 17 March 2014).  
3.4 The Role of Trade Unions and 
Collective Bargaining in the Adoption 
of Working Time Norms  
The right to organize is fundamental to the achievement of decent work. 
Trade unions also play a pivotal role in the establishment and enforcement 
of labor rights. Trade unions in developing nations are often important 
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actors in the struggle for democracy as well as for norms on working time 
and wages (Kelly et al., 2010, p. 379).  
The rate of unionization in Thailand is low. According to statistics from 
2010, 3.6 percent of workers are organized (ILOSTAT database). This 
number is even lower in enterprises with fewer than 10 employees, where 
only 0.2 percent is union members. In companies where the number of 
employees ranged from 10 to 99, circa 2 percent of workers reported that 
they belonged to a trade union. Large establishments show the highest 
numbers of organized worker at 14 percent (Pholphirul, 2007, p. 17). 
Unionization was prohibited by law until the mid-1970s. In addition to the 
opposition of workers’ organization by the government, employers have 
opposed the establishment of trade unions. Workers who have sought to 
organize have often experienced ‘harassment, threats of dismissal, arrest, 
and physical violence’ (American Center for International Labor Solidarity, 
2007, p. 16). Around 10,000 union promoters were dismissed by their 
employer between 1975 and 1993 (ibid., p. 16). A climate of hostility 
towards trade unions is a strong inhibitor of the unionization of workers. 
In Thailand, collective bargaining is of limited importance for the 
protection of decent working conditions (Pholphirul, 2007, p. 17). 
Bargaining predominantly takes place on enterprise level, where the effect 
of collective agreements is limited to the individual firms. Due to low 
numbers of organized workers and weak trade unions, the power imbalance 
between employees and employer remains. In these circumstances, the 
bargaining power of the workers is reduced and may lead to an agreement 
that heavily favors the interests of the employer (Yoshida, 2003, p. 357). 
The weakness of the Thai trade unions in general is detrimental for the 
progress towards decent working conditions. According to one estimate, 40 
percent of factories do not pay their employees the fixed minimum wage 
(Kelly et al., 2010, p. 379).  
Although the general rate of unionization in Thailand is low, it is non-
existent among domestic workers. Nor is this work regulated in collective 
agreements. For these workers, the right to unite was prohibited by 
Executive Order No. 54, which amended the Labor Relations Act to restrict 
freedom of association for certain groups of workers (American Center for 
International Labor Solidarity, 2007, p. 8). In addition, many domestic 
workers are migrant workers whose right to organize is clearly limited in 
Thai law, as they do not have the right to establish unions.  
There are many obstacles to the organization of employees in domestic 
work. However, organizations such as HomeNet Thailand are working with 
domestic workers to educate them on their rights as employees (interview 
with Poonsap Tulaphan, manager at HomeNet, 17 March 2014). They are 
also pushing for legislative changes that will offer greater protection for 
domestic workers’ rights. In their view, one of the most fundamental steps 
towards the improvement of working conditions in domestic work is the 
right to organize.   
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3.5 The Enforcement of Working Time 
Norms 
To achieve decent work for all, legal provisions on working conditions must 
be applied in practice. Labor inspection is central to the practical 
enforcement of working time standards (Yoshida, 2003, p. 360). The 
fundamental role of labor inspection is established in two international 
conventions: the Labour Inspection Convention 1947 (No. 81) and the 
Labour Inspection (Agriculture) Convention 1969 (No. 129), which require 
state parties to ‘maintain a system of labour inspection’ in industrial 
workplaces and agriculture (Article 1 and Article 3, respectively). These two 
governance conventions have been given special priority by the ILO.  
Neither of the two instruments has been ratified by Thailand. 
Labor inspection in Thailand is executed by the Department of Labour 
Protection and Welfare (DLPW) under the Ministry of Labour. Acts of 
central importance for labor inspection are the Labour Relations Act, 
Labour Protection Act, and the Occupational Safety, Health and 
Environment Act, BE 2554 (2011). 
The central task of labor inspectors is to oversee ‘compliance with 
general working conditions, occupation safety and health, labour welfare 
and labour relations’ (International Labour Organization, 2013). Labor 
inspectors shall visit establishments on a regular basis. Visits may also be 
initiated by request or complaint (ibid.). If the employer is in breach of 
legislation on working conditions, inspectors can issue a written order 
‘requiring the employer to improve the working environment’ (Section 104 
of the LPA). Where the employer has failed to comply with provisions on 
entitlements to any sum of money under the LPA, the labor inspector may 
issue an ‘order requiring the employer to pay that money to the employee’ 
(Section 124 of the LPA). Employees have the right to submit a complaint 
on such matters to the labor inspector under Section 123 of the LPA.  
Yoshida (2003, p. 360) notes that labor inspection is often neglected in 
developing nations. This is also true in Thailand, despite the establishment 
of institutions to carry out and monitor labor inspection on a national and 
regional level. Adequate inspection is hampered by insufficient numbers of 
inspectors: ‘each labour inspector has to review about 1,000 establishments 
a year’ (ibid., p. 360). As a result, de facto working conditions may differ 
greatly from what is stipulated by law.  
Working conditions in domestic work are particularly difficult to 
monitor, due to the fact that the work is performed in the private household 
of the employer. The effects of the new Ministerial Regulation on the 
working conditions in domestic work may not be visible yet. However, a 
study from 2013 showed that 82 percent of the domestic workers 
interviewed worked seven days per week, in violation of Section 28 of the 
LPA (Federation of Trade Unions in Burma, 2013, p. 11). While national 
legislation does not stipulate a limitation on daily working hours for 
domestic workers, the same study showed that 69 percent of the employees 
worked between 12 and 14.5 hours every day. For 20 percent of the 
interviewees, the working day extended beyond 15 hours (ibid., p. 20). 
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While 99 percent of the workers reported that they were allowed to rest 
during the working day, 94 percent said that the length of the rest period 
depended on the employers’ situation and whether the employee had 
finished her work (ibid., p. 13). These numbers indicate that working 
conditions for domestic workers deviate strongly from working time norms 
in the national legislation.  
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4 Domestic Work and Working 
Time Regulation in Sweden  
This chapter explores the fundamental characteristics of the Swedish labor 
law system, especially focusing on working time regulation. This chapter 
also examines the characteristics of domestic workers in Sweden and the 
applicability of working time regulation on domestic work.  
4.1 Fundamental Characteristics of the 
Swedish Labor Law System 
Sources of law in the Swedish labor system are EU law and international 
conventions, constitutional provisions, national labor legislation, and 
collective agreements. The jurisprudence of the Labour Court is also a 
source of law (Källström and Malmberg, 2009, p. 58).  
Membership in the European Union has a fundamental effect on the 
domestic legal system of States due to the supranational character of EU law 
(Davies, 2012, p. 3). A central principle of the Union is the primacy of EU 
law over national law, as established by the European Court of Justice in 
Case 6/64 Costa v Enel [1964] ECR 585. Another fundamental principle of 
the Union acquis is the doctrine of direct effect, according to which EU 
legislation under certain circumstances ‘can be applied by the national 
courts without any need for the national government to transpose it into the 
legal system’ (Davies, 2012, p. 3). These central principles create a 
hierarchy between national and EU law that means that institutions of the 
Union lay down the legal framework for the national labor market 
(Chalmers et al., 2010, p. 187).  
Article 3 of the Treaty on the European Union lists the central objectives 
of the Union. These include ‘full employment and social progress’ as well 
as the promotion of ‘social justice and protection [and] equality between 
women and men’. While Blanpain (2012, pp. 147–148) argues that these 
objectives must be recognized as ‘subordinate to the overall economic-
monetary goals of the EU’, the Treaty does not differentiate between these 
objectives of different nature. Rather, Article 3.3 of the TEU stipulates that 
the Union shall establish a ‘social market economy’.  
This is further emphasized in Article 6 of the TEU, which stipulates that 
the Union ‘recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights [of the European Union (12 December 2007) 
(2007/C 303/01)] … which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties’. 
Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the Treaty of the European Union did not include 
‘legally enforceable fundamental social rights’ (Blanpain, 2012, p. 149). 
Today, the Charter has legal effect and can be ‘enforced before the 
European Court of Justice’ (Barnard, 2012, p. 28). It contains civil and 
political rights, as well as economic and social rights. Article 31 of the 
Charter stipulates that every worker ’has the right to limitation of maximum 
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working hours, to daily and weekly rest periods and to an annual period of 
paid leave’. 
Labor law is categorized as social policy. The EU and its member states 
have a shared competence in this area. The ‘principal basis for the 
developing EU labor law’ is established by Article 151 of the TEU 
(Herzfeld Olsson, 2011, p. 37). The Article outlines the objectives of the 
Union within this field and recalls the importance of the social rights set out 
in European Charter and in the Community Charter of the Fundamental 
Social Rights of Workers. These objectives include, inter alia, improved 
living and working conditions and proper social protection. Article 153 
outlines the fields in which the Union ‘shall support and complement the 
activities of the Member states’ through the adoption of measures that 
encourage international cooperation and exchange of information and 
knowledge. The Union may also adopt directives containing ‘minimum 
requirements for gradual implementation’ in the specific fields (para. 2.2). 
The Union objectives are also pursued through the adoption of directives 
that require member states to ‘take steps to ensure that provisions they 
outline are given effect in national law’ (Davies, 2012, pp. 3–4). A central 
directive in the field of working time is Directive 2003/88/EC of November 
2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time. The 
Working Time Directive lays down minimum standards for the organization 
of working time with reference to periods of daily and weekly rest, as well 
as annual leave (Blanpain, 2012, p. 670). Article 3 of the Directive 
stipulates that ‘every worker is entitled to a minimum daily rest period of 11 
consecutive hours per every 24-hour period’. Workers shall also be entitled 
to rest breaks during the working day, provided that it exceeds six hours. 
The duration and terms on which breaks are granted shall be regulated by 
collective agreements or national legislation (Article 4).  In addition to the 
11 hours of daily rest, workers are entitled to 24 consecutive hours of rest 
per week (Article 5). Derogations from Articles 3–5 may be made by means 
of collective agreements at the national, regional or a lower level (Blanpain, 
2012, p. 686). Average weekly working time may not exceed 48 hours, 
including overtime (Article 6). Workers are granted four weeks of paid 
annual leave, which ‘may not be replaced by an allowance’ (Article 7). 
According to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the 
right of every worker to paid annual leave is a ‘particularly important 
principle of Community social law from which there can be no derogations 
and whose implementation by the competent national authorities must be 
confined within the limits expressly laid down by Directive 93/104’ (C-
173/99 R v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, ex parte BECTU 
[2001] ECR I-4881, para. 43). The ECJ has stressed that a ‘worker must 
normally be entitled to actual rest, with a view to ensuring effective 
protection of his health and safety’ (ibid., para. 44). In recent case law, the 
Court has ruled that paid annual leave accrues for employees on sick leave 
and that annual leave may be taken during this period or carried over to the 
following year (C-520/06 Stringer v. Revenue and Customs Commissioner 
[2009] ECR I-179).  
EU legislation constitutes the legal framework for the national labor 
market. In contrast, national labor law regulates in detail the ‘relationships 
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between workers, employers and trade unions’ (Davies, 2012, pp. 3–4). The 
Swedish Constitution consists of four fundamental laws. Chapter 2 of the 
1974 Instrument of Government contains provisions for the protection of 
fundamental labor rights, such as freedom of association and the right to 
strike.  Section 1(5) guarantees everyone the ‘freedom to associate with 
others for public or private purposes’. Section 14 stipulates that a ‘trade 
union or an employer or employers’ association shall be entitled to take 
industrial action unless otherwise provided in an act of law or under an 
agreement’.  
Swedish labor legislation acknowledges the naturally weaker position of 
an employee in relation to their employer, and has the character of 
protective legislation (Sigeman, 2010, p. 13). The 1982:80 Employment 
Protection Act is a central piece of legislation of the Swedish labor system, 
as it provides detailed regulation the conditions for termination of 
employment contracts. The purpose of the Act is to protect employees 
against arbitrary or unjustified dismissals. Other laws of importance are the 
1977:480 Annual Leave Act and the 1982:673 Working Hours Act, which 
set minimum standards for annual leave and working time.  
A central characteristic of the Swedish labor market model is the 
autonomy of the workers’ and employers’ organizations. This autonomy is 
primarily exercised through collective bargaining. The 1938 Saltsjöbaden 
Agreement between the Swedish Trade Union Confederation and the 
Swedish Employers Association established the principle that labor rules 
and regulations are negotiated by workers and employers, and that collective 
bargaining shall be conducted without the involvement of the government 
(Sigeman, 2010, p. 18). In contrast to many countries in Europe, Sweden 
still lacks legislation on minimum wage. Instead, this is set by collective 
agreements for different sectors of the labor market. Collective agreements 
regulate the relationship between employer and worker on different levels; 
the national level, within a certain industry, and on the local level between a 
specific employer and the organized employees (Sigeman, 2010, p. 76). The 
provisions in many statutes are of semi-mandatory character and may be 
circumvented by collective agreements. 
The 1976:580 Employment (Co-Determination in the Workplace) Act 
provides detailed regulation on the freedom of association (Sections 7–9) 
and the right collective bargaining (Section 10–17). According to Section 23 
of the Employment (Co-Determination in the Workplace) Act, collective 
agreements are agreements ‘in respect of conditions of employment or 
otherwise about the relationship between employers and employees’. 
Collective agreements regulate, inter alia, wages, working time and other 
conditions of work (Sigeman, 2010, p. 81). 
The Swedish Labour Court is a tripartite tribunal where representatives 
of workers’ and employers’ organizations, as well as regular judges, engage 
in the judicative activities. The procedure at the court is regulated by the 
1974:371 Labour Disputes (Judicial Procedure) Act. National courts are 
bound by the principle of interprétation conforme, which requires the courts 
to interpret national legislation consistently with the meaning and wording 
of the EU directive, to achieve the aim of the act (Bruun and Malmberg, 
2005, p. 32).  
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As a member of the ILO, Sweden is also bound by international labor 
standards. The influence of international labor standards on European labor 
law is not insignificant, as ‘policies, laws and collective agreements’ on the 
national as well as the European level have been inspired by ILO 
instruments (Herzfeld Olsson, 2011, p. 33). Although only States can be 
members of the ILO (ILO Constitution Art 1.2), the European Union has 
obtained observer status in the both the Governing Body and the 
International Labour Conference (ibid., p. 31–32). The eight core 
conventions of the ILO have been ratified by all EU member states. 
Ratification of all up-to-date conventions is encouraged by the European 
Commission and the European Parliament (ibid., p. 27).  
Sweden has the eight fundamental conventions and four governance 
conventions. Sweden has also ratified nearly half of the 177 technical 
conventions. Important instruments ratified by Sweden for the regulation of 
working time are the Forty-Hour Week Convention, 1935 (No. 47), the 
Holidays with Pay Convention (Revised), 1970 (No. 132) and the Part-Time 
Work Convention, 1994 (No. 175). Sweden has not ratified Convention No. 
189 on Domestic Workers. The Council of Ministers of the EU has 
authorized member states to ratify the convention. According to the 
Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, certain 
provisions of the Convention on Domestic Workers is already covered by EU 
law that, at times, is ‘more protective than the Convention’. Still, States are 
encouraged to implement the convention ‘as soon as possible’ since it is 
‘more precise than EU law on the coverage of domestic workers by 
legislation and in other particular aspects of domestic work’ (European 
Commission, 2014). The Government Offices of Sweden is currently 
analyzing the content of the convention in relation to domestic law. The 
result of this analysis will be relayed to the Swedish Parliament for further 
consideration at the end of 2014 (Riksdagen, 2013).  
4.2 General Characteristics of Domestic 
Work in Sweden  
4.2.1 Prevalence of Domestic Work and 
Composition of the Workforce 
The exact number of people employed in domestic work in Sweden is 
difficult to establish. Statistics Sweden, the government agency responsible 
for producing statistics, does not differentiate between people employed in 
private households and those employed to clean for example offices or 
school buildings (Gavanas and Calleman, 2013, p. 8). One way to estimate 
the prevalence of domestic work is to look at the number of people using 
this type of service. A person who hires someone to perform domestic 
services such as cleaning, laundry, or child minding is entitled to a tax 
deduction called RUT. In 2010, circa 326 000 people were entitled to this 
deduction (ibid.). These services were performed by 13 516 companies 
(ibid.). According to estimates by Almega – an employer’s association that 
organizes many of the employers in this sector – circa 12 000 people are 
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employed by their members (ibid.). This number does not account for 
employees of unorganized employers. Calleman (2006, p. 10) underlines 
how difficult it is to calculate the pervasiveness of domestic work, though 
these estimates indicate that the numbers are not insignificant and appears to 
be increasing, as a result of welfare reforms aimed at cutting public 
spending in the field of healthcare and eldercare. Users are often persons 
over 65 years of age and families with small children. Individuals who 
qualify for the RUT tax deduction are almost exclusively members of high-
income households (Gavanas and Calleman, 2013, p. 8). The most common 
task performed by domestic workers is cleaning. In 2010, 93 percent of 
private households using the special tax deduction for domestic work 
requested this service. In contrast, only one percent of households employed 
a domestic worker for child care (ibid, p. 7).  
No official figures exist on the composition of the workforce in domestic 
labor with regards to the gender, ethnicity, or age of the employees 
(Calleman, 2006, p. 13). Historically, this type of work has been performed 
by young women from non-metropolitan areas (Gavanas and Calleman, 
2013, p. 9). When women first entered the labor market, domestic work was 
the only formal employment available for women. When women were 
allowed to pursue other careers, domestic work quickly became a low-status 
job. The poor conditions of work in this sector led to a shortage of workers. 
As Swedish women abandoned paid domestic work, foreign-born women 
came to dominate the workforce (ibid.).  During the Second World War, 
female refugees were recruited as domestic workers (ibid., pp. 9–10). After 
the war, workers from neighboring Nordic nations as well as other countries 
could work as domestic workers in Sweden without work permit until 1972 
(Calleman, 2007, p. 46). This was required for non-Nordic citizens in other 
occupations.  
Today, migrant labor is seen as a ‘primary solution to the labor shortages 
of “ageing Europe”’ by EU and Swedish policymakers (Gavanas, 2010, p. 
23). The numbers of migrant workers in domestic work are increasing: a 
majority of the employees in this sector is foreign-born and female 
(Gavanas, 2013, p. 13). In Stockholm, foreign-born workers account for 80 
percent of the workforce (Calleman, 2011, p. 131). Some home-services 
companies cater to their customers’ preferences on the gender and ethnicity 
of the domestic worker (Gavanas, 2013, p. 93). Foreign-born women are 
particularly popular in care work (ibid., p. 93). The free movement of EU-
citizens within the Union and generous rules for migrant workers allow 
home-services companies to recruit from abroad. In addition, migrant 
workers in irregular situations are frequently employed in this sector. 
4.2.2 The Employment Relationship in 
Domestic Work 
Domestic workers are commonly employed by companies to work in private 
households. This distinguishes Sweden from the rest of the world, where the 
contract of employment is usually established between the domestic worker 
and the person whose house she is cleaning or children she is caring for 
(Gavanas and Calleman, 2013, p. 13). The special tax reduction for home 
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services encourages this arrangement and is not applicable to employment 
relationships. Home-services companies accounted for circa 60 percent of 
companies in the domestic-service sector in 2010 (ibid.). 
A contractual agreement may also be established between the domestic 
worker and a member of the household. If the contract is concluded by these 
actors, the domestic worker is acting either as self-employed or as an 
employee of the household (Calleman, 2006, p. 14). The distinction between 
employee status and self-employed is of central importance in Swedish 
labor law, since protective labor legislation is only applicable to 
employment relationships (Källström and Malmberg, 2009, p. 24). The 
definition of the nature of the relationship is dependent on the content of the 
contractual agreement rather than how it is defined by the parties, as 
established by the Labour Court in AD 1979 nr 155. According to the 
Labour Court, the evaluation of the employment status shall take into 
account all objective factors that point to either a contract of employment or 
a contract of services (ibid., p. 27). This principle was originally formulated 
by the Swedish Supreme Court in NJA 1949 s. 768. A similar approach is 
taken by the European Court of Justice (Källström and Malmberg, 2009 p. 
27). A factor indicative of a contract of employment is an obligation of the 
party to personally perform the work (personlig arbetsskyldighet). Another 
indication of employment is the subordination of the worker, i.e. the 
competence of the employer to direct and allocate the work, see for example 
AD 2005 nr 16. These two factors are core elements of the employment 
relationship (Källström and Malmberg, 2009 p. 27). If the employer 
provides the tools and equipment necessary for the job, this could also 
indicate that the parties are bound by an employment relationship (AD 1984 
nr 110). Payments of a set amount on a regular basis, e.g. weekly or 
monthly, also suggest the existence of an employment relationship (AD 
2005 nr 16). These are some of the factors that define the nature of the 
contractual relationship between two parties.  
To encourage female entrepreneurship is one reason behind the special 
tax deduction for domestic services introduced in 2007 to increase the use of 
these services by private households (Blomberg et al., 2010, p. 31). Hiring 
someone to take care of household tasks would allow female entrepreneurs 
to combine family life and work more easily (Strömberg and Wennberg, 
2010, p. 167). It would also stimulate female entrepreneurship in the 
domestic service sector – an aim of the action plan adopted by the Swedish 
government to promote gender equality (Blomberg et al., 2010, p. 31–32). 
In 2010, 40 percent of businesses in the domestic service sector were 
estimated to be self-employed (Gavanas and Calleman, 2013, p. 13).  
The introduction of measures to increase female entrepreneurship in this 
sector was also an attempt to formalize domestic work, which has frequently 
been performed outside the formal labor market. Domestic workers have 
traditionally been employed without a formal contact and outside the control 
of the authorities: the income from the work is unreported to evade taxes.  
Despite these measures, informal work has not been replaced by formal 
work. Instead, these economies coexist and a worker may operate in both 
‘simultaneously or on and off’ (Gavanas, 2010, p. 29). According to one 
study, the tough competition between companies in this sector affects the 
 39 
conditions of employment. Wages are low and full-time employment is rare 
(Kvist, 2013, pp. 35–36). To make ends meet, employees often work for 
several companies or outside their formal employment, sometimes in the 
same households that they serve as employees of registered companies 
(ibid.). Also: 
‘Formal and informal aspects of the domestic service sector 
intersperse as workers are hired informally by formally registered 
companies. Several interviewees told me that a cleaning company may 
charge a client for a certain amount of hours’ cleaning but in fact the 
work is being done in much less time by an (undocumented) (migrant) 
worker who gets paid off the books (Gavanas, 2010, p. 27). 
This illustrates how the formal and informal sectors co-exist, although 
employment and working conditions in domestic work is formally covered 
by existing legislation.   
4.3 The National Regulation of Working 
Time 
4.3.1 Employment in Home-Services 
Companies 
Working time for employees in home-services companies is regulated by 
general labor law. Central norms on working time are established by the 
1982:673 Working Hours Act. This law contains provisions on weekly 
working hours and the right to daily rests. As established by Section 3, the 
Working Hours Act is semi-mandatory. The rules of collective agreements 
may be imposed on employees who are not union members (Section 3, para. 
3).  
Swedish labor legislation is influenced by EU norms on working time. 
The implementation of EU directive 2003/88/EC concerning certain aspects 
of the organisation of working time led to changes in the Working Hours 
Act, for example in regards to the semi-mandatory character of the law, 
which allows for trade unions and employers’ organizations to establish 
other working time norms in collective agreements (Nyström, 2011, p. 344). 
Norms set by collective agreements must be in compliance with the 
provisions in the Working Time Directive. The implementation of the 
Directive also necessitated the adoption of Section 10 (b) of the Working 
Hours Act, which stipulates that the average total working time for each 
seven-day period, calculated over a four-month period, cannot exceed 48 
hours.  
The Working Hours Act is applicable to ‘all activities in which an 
employee performs work on behalf of an employer’, according to Section 1. 
Certain restrictions on the scope of the law are stipulated in Section 2. 
Another important piece of legislation regulating working time is the 
1977:480 Annual Leave Act, which specifies the general rules on the right 
to paid and unpaid annual leave. The provisions of this Act are also of semi-
mandatory character. In contrast to the Working Hours Act, the applicability 
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of the Annual Leave Act is unrestricted: The provisions of the Act apply to 
all employees in the private and public sectors, regardless of occupation and 
type of employment (Björknäs, H. Semesterlagen 1 §, lagkommentar not 1, 
1 April 2008, Karnov Internet).  
The Working Hours Act does not establish a limit on daily working 
hours. It does, however, stipulate that workers shall have a daily rest period 
of at least ‘eleven hours consecutive hours of free time for every period of 
twenty-four hours’ (Section 13). Special circumstances allow for temporary 
deviations from this rule (para. 1). This provision is mandatory and cannot 
be circumvented by collective agreements. The Act also stipulates certain 
restrictions on daily working hours in terms of rest intervals and breaks that 
the employee is entitled to. Rest intervals are ‘interruptions in daily working 
hours during which employees are not obliged to remain at the workplace’ 
(Section 15, para. 1). Rest intervals are not part of the waged working time. 
The Act stipulates that an employee is entitled to rest after five hours of 
work. The precise length and number of rest intervals per working day is not 
established by the law but ‘must be satisfactory with regard to working 
conditions’ (para. 3). According to case law, a rest interval spans over at 
least ten minutes. If the employee is allowed one rest interval per day, this 
should last at least 30 minutes. If two intervals are scheduled, one should 
last at least 15 minutes and the other one 30 minutes. (Blyme, H. 
Arbetstidslagen 15 §, lagkommentar not 39, 1 April 2014, Karnov Internet). 
In addition to rest intervals, the working day must include breaks (Section 
17). These breaks are part of the paid working day (para. 3). The Sections 
on rest intervals and breaks are mandatory.  
Maximum working time refers to working hours per week, i.e. a period 
of seven consecutive days. According to Section 5, regular working time 
may not exceed 40 hours per week. As mentioned above, the Act does not 
prescribe how these hours should be distributed on a daily basis or the 
length of the work day. This is the competence of the employer. Working 
hours is primarily regulated by legislation, collective agreements and other 
contracts. Within the parameters set by these statutes, the employer has far-
reaching control over how and when work shall be performed (Källström 
and Malmberg, 2009, p. 188–190).  The right of the employer to direct and 
allocate work – arbetsledningsrätten – is a fundamental principle in 
Swedish labor law. Distribution of hours may also be regulated by the 
parties in a collective agreement as long as the rules on mandatory rest 
intervals and breaks are adhered to. In sectors where the nature of the work 
may require flexible working time arrangements, for example the 
agricultural sector or the service sector, the average weekly working time 
per period of four weeks shall not exceed 40 hours (Section 5, paragraph 2).     
The Working Hours Act allows for overtime hours of two kinds – general 
(allmän) and extra overtime. For a full-time employee, overtime hours are 
those working hours that exceeds the maximum hours of regular working 
time, as stipulated in Section 5 or by a collective agreement. Section 8 
allows general overtime of 48 hours over a period of four weeks or 50 hours 
per calendar month, ‘subject to a maximum of 200 hours per calendar year’. 
In addition, extra overtime of 150 hours per calendar year may be worked 
by the individual employee, is there is a special reason at hand and that the 
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situation cannot be solved in any other way (Section 8 a). Special reasons 
may comprise sudden sickness among the employees or an increase in the 
workload that could not have been foreseen by the employer. According to 
paragraph 2 of Section 8 (a), the combined general and extra overtime for 
the individual employee may not exceed 48 hours per four weeks or 50 
hours per calendar month. This provision can be circumvented by collective 
agreements (Section 3). Employees are compensated for overtime in paid 
leave or overtime pay. The rate of compensation is regulated in collective 
agreements (Blyme, H. Arbetstidslagen 6 §, lagkommentar not 21, 1 April 
2014, Karnov Internet). Collective agreements also regulate the extent to 
which the employee is obligated to work overtime. 
In addition to the limitations on working hours, the Act establishes 
certain rules on the weekly rest. According to Section 14, worker shall enjoy 
at least 36 consecutive hours of weekly rest within ‘every period of seven 
days’. The provision also stipulates that the weekly rest shall be scheduled 
on weekends ‘to the extent possible’ (para. 2). The period of weekly rest 
may be scheduled at any point during the seven-day period.  
Annual leave is regulated by the 1977:480 Annual Leave Act. According 
to the law, employees are entitled to ‘annual leave, holiday pay and 
compensation in lieu of annual leave’ (Section 1). Employees shall receive 
‘twenty-five days of annual leave in every annual leave year’ (Section 4). 
The employee is also entitled to holiday pay ‘if he or she has earned such 
pay in accordance with Section 7’. At least 4 weeks of annual leave shall be 
scheduled during the months of June, July or August unless otherwise 
agreed (Section 12).  
4.3.2 Employment Directly in Households  
General working time legislation is not applicable to employees who are 
employed by a private individual to perform work in his or her home. 
Section 1 of the Working Hours Act stipulates that the provisions of the Act 
shall apply to ‘all activities in which an employee performs work on behalf 
of an employer, subject to the restrictions referred to in Section 2’. 
According to Section 2, work performed in employer’s household is 
excluded from the scope of the law. These workers are also excluded from 
the scope of the Employment Protection Act, according to Section 1.3. 
Instead, this type of work is regulated by the 1970:943 Domestic Work Act. 
The Domestic Work Act provides more generous rules on working time 
than the Working Hours Act. Domestic work has always been excluded 
from the scope of general legislation on working time. In the preparatory 
work of the Act, the continued relevance of special legislation for domestic 
work is motivated, inter alia, by a need to facilitate for families with small 
children to employ domestic workers during long and unsocial hours (Prop. 
1970:150, pp. 20–21). If this work was regulated by the Working Hours 
Act, the limitations on working time would require employment of several 
domestic workers to care for the children, provided that the parents have 
full-time jobs during normal working hours (ibid). According to the 
preparatory work, it is in the best interest of the child to have one full-time 
caretaker rather than several different part-time care-takers (ibid., p. 20).  
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Stricter limitations on working time for domestic workers could also hamper 
the possibilities for married women to find employment outside the 
household, as they would be confined to caring for the children, according 
to the preparatory work (ibid., p. 21).    
The provisions of the Act are mandatory. Agreements between employer 
and worker that is not compliance with the provisions of the Act do not have 
binding effect (Section 1, para. 2).   
The Act does not provide any rules on daily rest intervals or breaks. In 
terms of daily working hours, it stipulates that the employee shall be entitled 
to necessary (behövlig) nightly rest. This period of rest shall cover the hours 
between midnight and 5 a.m. if possible (Section 9).  
In similarity with the provision in the Working Hours Act, the chief rule 
on weekly working time in the Domestic Work Act stipulates that weekly 
working hours cannot exceed average 40 hours per week during a four week 
period (Section 2, para. 1). The distribution of working hours may differ 
from week to week. However, the Domestic Work Act entails the possibility 
to extend the weekly working time beyond the limits of the Working Hours 
Act. Section 2 stipulates an exception to this rule, which allows for the 
average weekly working time to extend to 52 hours. This is permitted when 
the work of the employee entails child care or care taking of other members 
of the household unable to care for themselves, if the employer is unable to 
personally provide such care due to employment outside the home. This 
exception is also applicable to situations where the employer has fallen ill.   
The rules on overtime are different from the rules in the Working Hours 
Act. The regulation of overtime is more generous in domestic work. 
According to Section 3 of the Domestic Work Act, the maximum limit on 
annual overtime is 300 hours per year. Section 8 of the Working Hours Act 
allows for 200 annual hours of overtime. The worker may be required to 
work overtime for special reasons. According to the preparatory work of the 
law, special reasons may encompass the need for extra help in preparation 
for a dinner party. It may also entail situations when the employer is 
required to work overtime at his or her work and therefore needs extra help 
with childcare. Normally, however, the worker is only required to work 
overtime when the two parties have agreed on it (Blyme, H. Lagen om 
arbetstid m.m. i husligt arbete 3 §, lagkommentar not 4, 1 April 2014, 
Karnov Internet).  
Working time is calculated differently for domestic workers whose 
employment is regulated by the Domestic Work Act and other employees 
whose working hours are regulated in the Working Hours Act or collective 
agreements. Normally, provisions in collective agreements on weekly and 
monthly limits on working time are based on the standard five-day work 
week (helgfri vecka). If the work week is shorter due to public holidays, the 
permitted number of working hours is decreased. In the Domestic Work 
Act, no reference is made to the standard five-day work week. This led the 
Labour Court to conclude in AD 1991 nr 91 that this is not the standard to 
be used in the calculation of working time for domestic workers (p. 584). As 
a result, the maximum working hours is not shortened when the work week 
is shortened by holidays. 
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The right to weekly and annual leave for domestic workers is equal to 
that of other workers. Domestic workers employed directly in household are 
entitled to weekly rest to the same extent as other workers: Section 9 states 
that workers have the right to 36 consecutive hours of weekly rest, 
preferably during the weekend (para. 2). The provisions of the Annual 
Leave Act are applicable to domestic workers, who shall receive paid and 
unpaid annual leave to the same extent as other workers.   
4.3.3 Self-Employment  
The purpose of the Swedish labor laws is to protect the employee, whose 
position is inherently weaker than the employer’s. Domestic workers who 
are independent contractors enter into contractual agreements with clients as 
equal parties. Protective labor laws are not applicable in these situations.  
A report released by the ILO in the 1990s describes ‘heterogeneity of 
self-employment’, which ‘at its best’ allows workers to ‘be autonomous, to 
realize their potential, and to reap financial rewards, while at worst it [is] a 
marginal and precarious form of employment’ (Fudge, 2006, p. 205). 
According to Fudge, women’s self-employment challenges the ‘traditional 
stereotype of self-employment … linked to ownership, autonomy, and 
control over production’, which is ‘clearly distinguishing … independent 
professionals, and small business proprietors from waged workers’ (ibid, pp. 
203–204). Since these domestic workers do not ‘own much by way of 
means of production, exercise little control over production, and do not 
accumulate capital’, they challenge the ‘simple dichotomy between 
subordination and independence’ in our understanding of self-employment 
(ibid). The veil of independence may hide a relationship where the self-
employed is as dependent on their client as an employee on their employer.  
4.4 The Role of Trade Unions and 
Collective Agreements in the Adoption 
of Working Time Norms  
The development of labor regulation in Sweden has to a large extent been 
controlled by employers’ associations and trade unions. The rate of 
unionization has traditionally been very high. Although the last years have 
shown a significant decrease in the number of trade union members, 
Sweden still has the highest percentage of organized workers in the world. 
In 2011, the organization rate was 70 percent among workers (Kjellberg, 
2014, p. 53). Collective bargaining has pushed the development of labor 
norms. The high rate of organization among employers and the possibility 
for unorganized employer to sign agreements with trade unions to adhere to 
conditions set by a particular collective agreement means that the percentage 
of workers covered by collective agreements is high, despite the falling 
numbers of union members (ibid., p. 43). The total percentage of workers 
covered by collective agreements in public and private sector is 90 percent 
(ibid., p. 31). Collective agreements are fundamental instruments in the 
regulation of labor conditions since certain minimum standards, such as 
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minimum wage, are set by these agreements. Many labor laws are also semi-
mandatory, which means that they may be circumvented by collective 
agreements that are more favorable to the employee.  
The role of trade unions and collective agreements for the regulation of 
working conditions in domestic work is dependent on the employment 
relationship. All workers are entitled to freedom of association. However, 
the rate of unionization is low among domestic workers.  
In 2009, only between 5 and 10 percent of employees in home-services 
companies were estimated to be union members (Gavanas and Calleman, 
2013, pp. 13–14). The Swedish Municipal Workers' Union, has collective 
agreements with 120 companies in the home-services sector (ibid.).  
According to Anita Lundgren, ombudsman at the Swedish Municipal 
Workers' Union, employment in private households is usually informal 
work, i.e. unregistered with the authorities for the purpose of evading costs 
such as payroll taxes. These workers are not organized by the Swedish 
Municipal Workers' Union, and the union has not taken any measures to 
reach these workers. According to Lundgren, the assistance the union could 
offer this category of workers is very limited.  There are no employers’ 
associations for these households. As a result, no collective agreements exist 
for these workers.   
Independent contractors may join Unionen, the largest white-collar trade 
union in Sweden. Membership benefits include income insurance and free 
legal advice but there is no possibility for independent contractors to bargain 
collectively for better working conditions.  
4.5 The Enforcement of Working Time 
Norms 
The system of labor inspection is well-developed in Sweden (Sigeman, 
2010, p. 231). Early legislation for the protection of workers’ safety and 
health at the workplace was adopted in the 19
th
 century in Sweden (Gullberg 
and Rundqvist, 2013, p. 17). Since then, statutes in this field of law have 
seen several reforms, most recently as a result of Sweden’s membership in 
the European Union (ibid., p. 18–21). Sweden has ratified the Labour 
Inspection Convention 1947 (No. 81) and the Labour Inspection 
(Agriculture) Convention 1969 (No. 129), which require state parties to 
‘maintain a system of labour inspection’ in industrial workplaces and 
agriculture (Article 1 and Article 3, respectively).  
Domestic statutes of central importance for labor inspection are the 
1977:1160 Work Environment Act, the Working Hours Act, and the 
2007:913 Work Environment Authority (Standing Instructions) Ordinance. 
The scope of the Work Environment Act is wide; it is applicable to 
practically all work that is performed in an employment relationship. In 
addition, some provisions apply to the self-employed (Gullberg and 
Rundqvist, 2013, p. 22). Local agreements between trade unions and 
employers’ organizations are also of central importance to establish and 
maintain a healthy work environment (Gullberg and Rundqvist, 2013, p. 
25).  
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Labor inspection in Sweden is executed by the Swedish Work 
Environment Authority (SWEA) under the Ministry of Employment 
(Chapter 7, the Work Environment Act). SWEA is also responsible for the 
inspection of labor conditions with reference to working time, according to 
Section 20 of the Working Time Act. 
Non-compliance with legal requirements on working time may lead to 
penalties for the employer in the form of a fine or, in the case of a serious 
violation, imprisonment (Sections 17–20 of the Domestic Work Act and 
Sections 20–23 of the Working Hours Act).  
Labor inspection shall also be carried out in private households. To 
protect the privacy of the employer, restrictions are imposed on labor 
inspection in the domestic service sector (Gullberg and Rundqvist, 2013, p. 
54). According to the Domestic Work Act and the Work Environment 
Authority (Standing Instructions) Ordinance, labor inspection in private 
homes may only be carried out under special circumstances or on request by 
one of the parties.  
According to official estimates from 2008, the average working time for 
domestic workers in Sweden was 32.5 hours per week (International Labour 
Office, 2010, p. 57). These are the formal hours of work by domestic 
workers. As discussed above, the interconnectedness of formal and informal 
work in this sector makes estimates of the total hours of work for these 
employees difficult to estimate.   
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5 The Protection of the Right to 
Decent Working Time for 
Domestic Workers in the 
National Regulation of 
Thailand and Sweden – a 
Comparative Analysis 
The objective of this chapter is to compare the extent to which the labor 
laws of Thailand and Sweden regulate and protect the right to decent 
working time for domestic workers. The comparison is based on the 
understanding of decent working time in international labor standards and 
further parameters of decent working time proposed by the ILO: healthy 
working time, family-friendly working time, gender equality trough 
working time, productive working time, and choice and influence of the 
worker over working time. The first part of the chapter is a discussion on the 
similarities and differences of two domestic legal systems in general. 
5.1  The Labor Law Systems of Thailand 
and Sweden 
In Thailand and Sweden, the domestic legal system is situated within the 
civil law legal family. In both systems, central sources of labor law include 
the constitution, statutes, collective agreements and jurisprudence of 
national courts.  In Sweden, EU law constitutes an additional source.  
Both countries are members of the ILO. The number of ratified 
Conventions and Recommendations differs greatly between Thailand and 
Sweden. Sweden has ratified all eight fundamental conventions and the four 
governance conventions of special priority. Sweden has also ratified nearly 
half of the technical conventions. In comparison, the number of ratifications 
by Thailand is limited and includes only nine of the 177 technical 
instruments. Thailand is party to five of the eight core conventions but has 
not ratified the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organize Convention or the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining 
Convention.    
Despite these differences in the number of ratifications of international 
labor standards, the limits prescribed by national legislation in both 
countries are generally in line with international standards on working time. 
In Thailand, the standard working week is 48 hours, in contrast to 40 hours 
in Sweden. These limits are in compliance with international labor norms on 
working time, which prescribe that states shall progressively reduce the 
weekly working time from 48 hours – the limit stipulated by e.g. the Hours 
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of Work (Industry) Convention – to a 40-hour working week. The eight-
hour work day is a general standard in Thailand and Sweden, as well as in 
international labor law.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, labor law regulation in low- and middle-
income nations often allow generous overtime hours. In Thailand, 
Ministerial Regulation No. 3 under the Labour Protection Act stipulates that 
the number of overtime hours shall not exceed 36 hours in any one week. In 
contrast, Swedish legislation allows for 48 hours of total working time per 
four weeks, or 50 hours per calendar month. According to the Hours of 
Work Conventions Nos. 1 and 30, overtime shall be fixed by regulations 
made by public authority. While the Conventions on working time only 
stipulate that overtime must be regulated by the competent authorities, the 
Committee of Experts emphasize that ‘such authorities do not have 
unlimited discretion in this regard’ (International Labour Conference, 2005, 
para. 144).  Rather, such regulations must ensure that limits on overtime 
work are ‘reasonable’ and:  
‘in line with the general goal of the instruments, namely to establish 
the eight-hour day and 48-hour week as a legal standard of hours of 
work in order to provide protection against undue fatigue and to 
ensure reasonable leisure and opportunities for recreation and social 
life’ (ibid.). 
In light of this, it is doubtful that Thai legislation satisfies the requirements 
on overtime regulations stipulated by intentional labor law.  
While no international convention regulates the right to rest periods 
during the working day, legislation in Thailand and Sweden alike stipulate 
that workers are entitled to a period of rest after five hours of work.  
Longer periods of rest, i.e. weekly rest and annual leave, are regulated by 
international labor standards. Weekly rest shall consist of 24 consecutive 
hours every seven-day period, according to international labor standards. 
According to Thai legislation, workers are awarded one day off per week. In 
Sweden, weekly rest shall extend over 36 hours per seven-day period. In 
both cases, national legislation fulfils the requirements stipulated by 
international law. In reference to annual leave, workers are entitled to a 
minimum of three working weeks for one year of service by the Holidays 
with Pay (Revised) Convention.  Depending on the length of the work week, 
this amounts to either 15 or 18 days.  The annual leave of Thai workers is 
significantly shorter than for their Swedish counterparts’. Paid annual leave 
for Thai workers constitute six days per year. In addition to these six days, 
workers are entitled to 13 days of traditional holiday annually. According to 
Article 6 of the Holidays with Pay (Revised) Convention, however, ‘public 
and customary holidays, whether or not they fall during the annual holiday, 
shall not be counted as part of the minimum annual holiday with pay’. Thai 
workers are not entitled to leave that corresponds to the international norms 
on annual paid leave. Swedish workers receive 25 days of annual leave, in 
compliance with international requirements.   
The institutions guarding the implementation of labor legislation are 
similar in the two countries: labor disputes are primarily settled by the 
national labor court, labor inspection is carried out by a specialized 
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administrative body. Conditions of employment are negotiated through 
collective bargaining and established in legally binding collective 
agreements. Minimum standards in terms of conditions of work are mainly 
established by law (Yoshida, 2003, p. 348). While trade unions and 
collective bargaining are permitted in both labor systems, the position of 
trade unions is significantly weaker in Thailand than in Sweden. The failure 
of Thailand to ratify the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right 
to Organize Convention and the Right to Organize and Collective 
Bargaining Convention is indicative of the suppression of collective labor 
rights here. In a recent survey by the International Trade Union 
Confederation (ITUC) on the protection of collective labor rights in 
different countries, Thailand was rated among the worst countries in this 
regard. In contrast, the protection of collective labor rights in Sweden was 
viewed as satisfactory (2014, pp. 38–39). The average rate of organization 
in the two countries also illustrates this difference between the two 
countries: in Thailand only 3.6 percent of the workforce is organized, while 
the rate of organization in Sweden exceeds 70 percent. As a consequence, 
the role of these institutions in the adoption of working time norms and the 
protection of workers’ interests differs between the two countries. 
5.2 The Situation for Domestic Workers in 
Thailand and Sweden 
As evident from the discussion in previous chapters on the general 
characteristics of domestic work in Thailand and Sweden, this sector is 
inherently heterogeneous.  
Official estimates on the number of people employed in domestic work 
are often inaccurate, due to the ‘high incidence of undeclared or illegal 
work’ in this sector (ibid.). The domestic service sector in both Thailand and 
Sweden is interlinked with the informal economy.  
The occupations included in the concept of domestic work vary from 
country to country. In some countries, domestic workers include private 
drivers and security guards, while in others these occupations are covered by 
other sectors (Tomei, 2011, pp. 258–259). In Sweden, cleaning is frequently 
requested, while domestic workers in Thailand often provide care for 
children and other family members (Gavanas and Calleman, 2013, p. 7).  
In addition to the various occupations and tasks that are covered by the 
term domestic work, the relationship between the worker and the household 
in this type of work is equally varied (Tomei, 2011, p. 259). Domestic 
workers in Sweden are either employed by home-services companies or the 
household. They may also be self-employed. In Thailand, domestic workers 
are commonly employed by a household, on a part-time or full-time basis. 
Another parameter of employment is the choice between live-in and live-out 
arrangements, the former which is common in Thailand (Federation of 
Trade Unions in Burma, 2013, p. 15). Live-in arrangements have a direct 
impact on terms of employment as well as working conditions (Anderson, 
2000, pp. 40–41).   
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While domestic work in Thailand and Sweden illustrates the 
heterogeneity that characterizes this type of work in general, the domestic 
work sectors in the two countries also have certain features in common. 
First of all, domestic workers are predominantly women. They usually 
belong to disadvantaged groups – in both Thailand and Sweden many 
domestic workers are migrant workers (Tomei, 2011, p. 259).  
Another feature of domestic work in both countries is the prevalence of 
informal work. Although statutory limitations on working time may be on 
par with the limitations set by international standards, workers are denied 
the protection of the law when employment arrangements are informal. In 
these circumstances, legislation on working hours is not adhered to. 
Employees in informal work often work extensive hours (American Center 
for International Labor Solidarity, 2007, p. 11).  
Whether employed as a live-in or live-out worker, the employee in 
domestic work often experience a significant degree of isolation. While this 
is an inherent characteristic of live-in work, it remains true also for live-out 
workers as domestic work is usually performed by a single employee.  
The isolation in domestic work restricts the ability of these employees to 
organize, provided their right to organize is unrestricted. In Thailand, 
domestic workers are prohibited by law to join a trade union. In Sweden, 
freedom of association is awarded all workers. Among domestic workers, 
however, the rate of unionization is significantly lower than the national 
average. Domestic workers employed in home-services companies are 
organized by Kommunal, but rate of unionization is only between 5 and 10 
percent (Gavanas and Calleman, 2013, pp. 13–14). For workers employed 
by a private individual, no such organization exists. Since Thailand and 
Sweden display vast differences in the general rate of organization, it is 
noteworthy that unionization among domestic workers in both countries is 
extremely limited. 
Another problem for this category of workers is the lack of employer 
organizations to bargain with. In Sweden, there are employers’ associations 
that organize home-services companies. For private households that employ 
domestic workers, no such organization exists. A reason for the lack of 
organization among individual employers could be a failure to recognize 
domestic work as work and themselves as employers (Anderson, 2000, p. 
158). These notions are obstacles to achieving decent work in domestic 
work: while working time regulation may be in place, application of such 
regulation is be hindered by private household not recognizing their role as 
employers. As a result, domestic workers are de facto denied the status as 
employees and the right to protection by existing labor legislation 
obstructed. Even if domestic workers in private households would organize, 
the absence of employers’ associations to bargain with hinders the 
establishment of collective agreements in both countries. This problem 
prevails for self-employed in Sweden. While these workers enjoy the same 
right to organize as other workers, there is no possibility for this category of 
workers to bargain collectively for better working conditions.  
As this comparison of the domestic work sectors in Thailand and Sweden 
shows, there is a degree of heterogeneity in domestic work. Still, certain 
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characteristics, that seem almost inherent in domestic work, prevail in both 
countries. 
5.3 The Regulation and Protection of 
Decent Working Time in the National 
Regulation of Working Hours 
5.3.1 Compliance of National Legislation with 
International Labor Standards on Working 
Time for Domestic Workers   
The Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189) is applicable to ‘any 
person engaged in domestic work within an employment relationship’ 
(Articles 1). Self-employed workers are excluded from the scope of the 
convention. The working time of these workers is not regulated in national 
or international labor law.  These workers are omitted from the following 
analysis, in which the national regulation is compared to the standards 
stipulated by international law.  
While neither Sweden nor Thailand have ratified the Domestic Workers 
Convention, the provisions in this instrument constitute internationally 
recognized minimum standards for domestic work. Incompliance with the 
standards in the convention does not constitute a breach of the State’s 
obligations, but would be of importance for a possible ratification of the 
convention in the future.  
As discussed above, Article 10 is the central article on working time. It 
stipulates that member states shall takes steps to ensure ‘equal treatment 
between domestic workers and workers generally in relation to normal 
working hours, overtime compensation, periods of daily and weekly rest and 
paid annual leave in accordance with national laws, regulations or collective 
agreements’ (para. 1). In other words, this paragraph requires States to 
ensure that the working time standards for domestic workers are equal to 
those pertaining to the labor market in general. The requirement on equal 
treatment is significant, since domestic work frequently is exempted from 
national legislation. In addition, the Article specifically stipulates that 
domestic workers shall enjoy 24 consecutive hours of rest weekly (para. 2).  
‘Normal hours of work’ can refer to both daily and weekly working 
hours. In both countries, the normal weekly hour is specified by legislation: 
in Sweden, the regular work week is 40 hours long while Thai legislation 
allows for 48 hours of normal working time per week. These limits are 
consistent with international standards on working time.  
Swedish domestic workers enjoy equal treatment with workers in general 
in terms of normal weekly working hours. The Domestic Work Act, 
however, contains an exception to this rule. Weekly working hours may be 
extended to 52 hours per week for domestic workers with care 
responsibilities (Section 2, para. 2). Thai workers, on the other hand, are 
completely excluded from the scope of the provision of general applicability 
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on limits to the working week (Section 23 of the LPA). As a result, their 
working week may extend beyond 48 hours.  
The exclusion of domestic workers from the scope of the provision on 
normal working time also means that the normal working day of a domestic 
worker in Thailand may exceed eight hours, which is the general limit to the 
working day (Section 23). Daily working time is not regulated by law in 
Sweden: the length of the working day is subject to limitations set by the 
rules on daily rest. For employees of home-services companies, the period 
of daily rest shall consist of 11 consecutive hours (Section 13 of the 
Working Time Act). This in on par with the regulation on daily rests for 
employees in general. For domestic workers employed in private 
households, however, the content of the right to daily rest is not regulated in 
detail. The exact number of hours of rest is not specified; the relevant 
section stipulates that the employee is entitled to ‘necessary’ night rest 
(Section 9 of the Domestic Work Act). This does not meet the requirement 
of equal treatment stipulated in Article 10 of the Domestic Workers 
Convention.   
Employees in home-services companies in Sweden enjoy equal treatment 
with other workers in the area of normal working hours. Their daily and 
weekly hours working hours and periods of rest are organized according to 
the same principles as those that apply to the workforce in general. These 
workers are also entitled to limits on overtime that correspond with the 
general rules on the labor market. 
In contrast, Swedish domestic workers who are employed in private 
households may be required to work more overtime than the general 
workforce. As discussed above, the rules on general overtime for employees 
in household allow for up to 300 hours annually, in contrast to the general 
limit on 200 annual hours of overtime.  
As daily and weekly working time for Thai domestic workers is 
unspecified in the national legislation, a limit on overtime hours does not 
exist for these workers. This is clearly incompatible with Article 10 of the 
Domestic Workers Convention, as other workers are entitled to such 
limitations on standard working time and overtime (Section 23 of the LPA). 
In contrast to the regulation on normal hours of work and overtime, 
weekly rest is an area where all domestic workers both countries are entitled 
to the same treatment as other workers. In Thailand, workers are awarded 
one day off per week (Section 28). This Section is applicable to domestic 
workers. In Sweden, employees in both home-services companies and 
private households are entitled to 36 consecutive hours of rest per week 
(Section 14 of the Working Hours Act, Section 9 of the Domestic Work 
Act). Legislation in both countries also fulfils the requirement in Article 10 
that stipulates that weekly rest for domestic workers must be ‘at least 24 
consecutive hours’ (para. 2).  
The national rules on annual leave also fulfil the requirement on equal 
treatment stipulated by Article 10 of the Domestic Workers Convention. 
Domestic workers in Thailand are awarded an equal number of days of 
traditional and annual holiday as other workers (LPA Sections 29–30). The 
Annual Leave Act of Sweden is applicable to all workers. The provisions in 
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this Act award domestic workers 25 days of paid annual leave, the same 
number of days as other employees (Section 4).  
A comparison of the national regulation reveals variations in the extent to 
which domestic legislation in Thailand and Sweden regulate and protect the 
right to decent working time for domestic workers. The category of workers 
whose rights are identical with those of the general workforce is employees 
in home-services companies in Sweden. As the regulation of their working 
time does not deviate from the general rules on working time in Sweden, the 
requirement of equal treatment is satisfied. The content of the legislation is 
also in compliance with international standards on decent working time. 
With reference to these legal parameters of decent working time, the right of 
these workers is protected by national legislation.  
For employees in individual households, the other category of employees 
in Sweden, the right to decent working time is not protected to the same 
extent by the national legislation. The special Swedish law that regulates 
domestic work contains provisions on daily and weekly working time which 
do not adhere to the general regulation on working time. This constitutes 
unequal treatment of household employee in relation to other workers. Thus, 
the right to decent working time for these employees is not sufficiently 
protected by national legislation.  
Despite recent legislative changes, national labor regulation does not 
fully protect the right to decent working time for domestic workers in 
Thailand. While the content of the working time regulation adheres to 
international standards on decent working time, the exclusion of domestic 
workers from a central provision on daily and weekly working hours is not 
in compliance with Article 10 of the Domestic Workers Convention. 
5.3.2 The National Regulation of Working Hours 
and Further Parameters of Decent 
Working Time 
In addition to the requirements on the legal standards in working time, 
current research in the area of working time has lead the ILO to propose five 
dimensions of decent working time that should guide the implementation of 
national and international legislation. This part is a discussion on the how 
these parameters are recognized in the national legislation and the situation 
of domestic workers in Thailand and Sweden. What is the role of these 
parameters in the life and work of domestic workers? How relevant are 
these parameters to domestic workers? How are these considerations 
showing in the working time policies and realities of domestic workers? 
This part is an analysis of how domestic legislation can be said to regulate 
and protect these parameters of working time in domestic work. The 
parameters are healthy working time, family-friendly working time, gender 
equality trough working time, productive working time, and choice and 
influence of the worker over working time. 
The 48-hour working week is the ‘legal standard closest to the point 
beyond which regular work becomes unhealthy’, which occurs at 50 hours 
per week (Lee et al., 2007, pp. 8–9). International regulation on working 
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hours adheres to this limit. For employees in Sweden, healthy working time 
is guaranteed by the legal regulation on working time which stipulates that 
the weekly working time 40 hours long. Employees with care 
responsibilities in household constitute an exception to these rules. The 
regulation for domestic workers in Thailand does not reflect this parameter 
of decent working time, as the length of the working week is unregulated by 
domestic law. This is also true for workers not covered by national labor 
legislation, such as the self-employed.  
The 48-hour limit is also significant for the family-friendly dimension of 
working time. Studies show that a large percentage of persons who work 
more than 48 hours per week find their working hours incompatible with 
family life (International Labour Office, 2011, p. 39). Balance between 
work and family life is a central consideration in discussions on decent 
working time and working time regulation in Europe today, but a 
consideration that has not always been of importance. Many working time 
standards are grounded in a “conception of the workplace as a discrete and 
bounded sphere of social and economic activity in which participants are 
fully and exclusively engaged” (Anxo et al, 2004, p. 15). As women have 
joined the workforce, the need for working time policies which allow for the 
combination of work and family life has become increasingly important 
(Anxo et al, 2004, p. 15). For domestic workers whose working time is 
regulated by law, in the case of Swedish employees, this parameter is 
reflected in the regulation of their working time, if we assume that a 40-hour 
week is compatible with family life. An interesting exception to this is the 
rule in the Domestic Worker Act, which stipulates that the weekly working 
time may be extended to 52 hours, if the employer is hindered from 
performing the necessary care work due to for example an employment 
outside the home. This rule makes the combination of work and family more 
difficult for the worker, but appears to be motivated by the needs of the 
employer to balance family and work life.  
For other categories of domestic workers, a sound balance between work 
and family is even more difficult to attain. While working time for self-
employed is not regulated to promote this parameter of decent working 
time, this type of employment is often hauled as an alternative for women 
who seek to combine work with family life. While self-employed women 
report the highest degree of satisfaction with family-work balance, ‘the 
proportions of workers working excessively long hours are higher in self-
employment than in paid (waged) employment for both men and women 
and in both developed and developing countries’ (International Labour 
Office, 2011, p. 39) 
One group of domestic workers that experience particular difficulties in 
balancing family and work life is live-in workers. As discussed with respect 
to healthy working time, the days of these workers are often very long. In 
theory, the work of live-in could be scheduled in accordance with limits on 
working hours as not to pose a threat to their health. The realization of 
family friendly working time for these workers, however, appears 
impossible to realize as they are physically removed from their family.  
Working time is widely recognized as a factor that may hamper gender 
equality: long or unpredictable working hours create ‘barriers to 
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occupational entry or progression for those with care responsibilities’, i.e. 
women (Fagan, 2004, 136–137).  The effect of long hours is two-fold; men 
are unable to participate in family life and women’s access to the formal 
labor market is restricted due to their care responsibilities. Instead, women 
are pushed into part-time arrangements, often of a precarious character. The 
general trends on working hours indicate that men work longer hours than 
women. Domestic work seems mal placé in this debate on the role of 
working time in furthering gender equality. As discussed above, regulation 
of working hours for domestic workers have traditionally allowed for longer 
hours than general working time regulation. Statistics show that domestic 
workers are the group of employees who work some of the longest hours 
globally (International Labour Office, 2013a, p. 56). These workers are not 
hindered by their care responsibilities, rather their care responsibilities are 
ignored in the regulation of their working time, as evident in national labor 
legislation for domestic workers in Thailand and Sweden. Work in the lower 
segment of the labor market is also characterized by long working hours and 
flexible arrangements. Employees in many home-services companies 
request longer working hours, to earn a wage they can survive on (Kvist, 
2013, p. 35). Although extensive working hours are common in the service 
sector, it is dominated by women. The discussion working time and gender 
equality must be calibrated to be of relevance as a parameter of decent 
working time for domestic workers.   
Productive working time is interconnected with the length of the working 
day: ‘[i]n many industries, it appears that shorter hours are associated with 
higher output rates per hour’ (International Labour Office, 2011, p. 46). In 
general, it is in the interests of both parties to the employment relationship 
to organize work to increase productivity: higher output rates serve the 
interests of the employers, while workers benefit from shorter working 
hours. Reduced working time improves employees’ ‘self-reported 
performance on the job … and satisfaction’ (International Labour Office, 
2011, p. 46). Domestic work is different from production in a factory or 
even in an office. What is the role of productivity in domestic work? For 
live-in workers, the idea of productivity is of limited importance. Such 
employment relationships are not based on an idea of productivity, but of 
‘permanent availability’:  
‘Workers commonly complain of having to be available at both ends 
of the day, early in the morning for children and late at night for 
entertaining guests. … This is compounded by some employers’ 
apparent dislike of seeing their workers rest: live-in workers 
complained that if their employer caught them sitting down, they 
would immediately find them a task to do. Clearly this is particularly 
difficult when workers are spending not just a few hours, but all their 
time in their employers’ houses, and unlike those in live-out work, 
cannot control their time and make their own breaks’ (Anderson, 
2000, p. 41).  
An increase in productivity does not lead to a shorter work day but a larger 
workload for the live-in worker.  
For workers who service several households, either as self-employed or 
employees, an increase in productivity might allow them to take on more 
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clients, as the length of each visit is shortened. Still, working days of these 
workers often include periods of unproductivity, due to the commute 
between different household (King Dejardin, 2011, p. 2).  
There is a growing recognition of the need to allow workers’ preferences 
to be reflected in their working time arrangements (Anxo et al, 2004, p. 15). 
For workers in an employment relationship, collective bargaining at 
company level is fundamental to ensure workers’ influence over working 
time and schedule (Messenger, 2004, p. 21). This allows ‘employers and 
trade unions to arrive at creative and innovative agreements that balance 
these respective interests’ (International Labour Office, 2011, p. 23). 
Collective bargaining could be an important tool to increase workers’ choice 
and influence over working time. This is, however, dependent on the ‘level 
of development of collective bargaining institutions in each country’: in 
systems where collective bargaining is well-developed, binding agreements 
between workers and employers can create important standards to 
complement statutory norms (International Labour Office, 2011, p. 23). In 
Sweden, where collective bargaining institutions are well-developed, 
measures that allow workers to influence their work schedule have been 
successfully implemented. Such measures include for example the right to 
flextime. However, rates of unionization is only between five and ten 
percent among Swedish domestic workers (Gavanas and Calleman, 2013, 
pp. 13-14), which hampers the influence of collective bargaining in this 
particular sector. The organization of work is dependent on the schedule of 
the households, who often request that work is performed during office 
hours. Flexibility in working time for employees in home-services 
companies caters to the needs of the clients rather than the workers (Kvist, 
2013, pp. 39–40).  
In Thailand, domestic workers are not able to organize. The working time 
of these workers is solely regulated by the individual employment contract 
and legislation, which limits the power of the workers to influence their 
distribution of working hours. In Thailand, live-in work is also common. 
The parameter of choice and influence over working time is particularly 
unattainable for live-in workers. Lack of control over working hours is the 
‘most common complaint among live-in workers, whatever city they live in, 
whether they work for ‘good’ or ‘bad’ employers’ (Anderson, 2000, p. 40). 
Flexibility in working hours for these workers is dictated by the need of 
their employer. Indicative of this is also the frequent ‘day off swapping’ 
among employers of live-in workers, which requires the worker to adjust 
their day off to suit the needs of the household (Anderson, 2000, p. 42). 
Cross-national unionization in this sector is just about 1 percent, suggesting 
that domestic workers in general have little choice and influence over their 
working time (Federici, 2012, p. 120).  
In contrast to employees in home-services companies or private 
households, whose position is naturally weaker than their employer’s, self-
employed domestic workers and their clients are regarded as equals. In 
Sweden, self-employment is often hailed as an arrangement that allows for 
more freedom and flexibility, suggesting that self-employed have greater 
choice and influence over their working time (Strömberg and Wennberg, 
2010, p. 171). The long hours of self-employed in comparison to other 
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employees suggest that the extent to which self-employed may control and 
influence their hours of work is exaggerated (International Labour Office, 
2011, p. 39). 
5.4 The Enforcement of Working Time 
Norms in Domestic Work in Sweden 
and Thailand 
Labor inspection is central to the practical enforcement of working time 
standard, as established in the two international conventions on labor 
inspection: the Labour Inspection Convention 1947 (No. 81) and the Labour 
Inspection (Agriculture) Convention 1969 (No. 129), require state parties to 
‘maintain a system of labour inspection’ (Article 1 and Article 3, 
respectively). Both instruments are ratified by Sweden; Thailand has ratified 
neither. However, institutions exist in both Thailand and Sweden to carry 
out labor inspection. 
Working conditions in domestic work are particularly difficult to 
monitor, due to the fact that the work is performed in the private household 
of the employer. In Thailand, adequate inspection is hampered by 
insufficient numbers of inspectors: ‘each labour inspector has to review 
about 1,000 establishments a year’ (Yoshida, 2003, p. 360). De facto 
working conditions may differ greatly from what is stipulated by law. Even 
if labor inspection of private homes could be carried out in theory, the 
general conditions of inspection hinder effective control of working 
conditions in domestic work. In Sweden, restrictions are imposed on labor 
inspection in the domestic service sector to protect the privacy of the 
employer (Gullberg and Rundqvist, 2013, p. 54). Labor inspection in private 
homes may only be carried out under special circumstances or on request by 
one of the parties.  
These restrictions are informed by the idea of a division between the 
public and the private sphere. Anderson suggests that the boundaries 
separating these spheres are ‘not real; they shift; they are negotiable’: 
The boundaries are culturally specific (Yuval Davies 1991) but even 
within a dominant culture, where boundaries are drawn by the state, 
they depend on gender, class, “race”, sexuality, age and other 
variables … The most intimate details of a person’s life may be 
publicly explored in an immigration appeals tribunal – I have heard 
Home Office lawyers inquiring in such circumstances, for example, at 
what age a woman “lost her virginity” (Anderson, 2000, p. 173).  
In addition to these legal restrictions, the prevalence of informality in this 
sector may hinder the enforcement of working time norms in domestic 
work. As many domestic workers are migrants of irregular status, the 
employee herself may be reluctant to file a complaint with the authorities 
over violations of her employment rights.  
As described in Chapter 3, studies indicate that working conditions for 
domestic workers in Thailand deviate strongly from working time norms in 
the national legislation. In Sweden, official estimates show that the average 
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working time for domestic workers in Sweden is 32.5 hours per week 
(International Labour Office, 2010, p. 57).  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 58 
6 Working Time Regulation in 
Domestic Work from a 
Materialist Feminist 
Perspective  
This concluding chapter examines working time regulation in domestic 
work from a materialist feminist perspective. The aim of this chapter is to 
discuss how the regulation and protection of working time can be 
understood in connection with the special role of domestic work in the 
international division of labor. There are significant differences between the 
labor law systems in Thailand and Sweden. Still, regulation of working time 
in both countries, and perhaps on the international level, offers insufficient 
protection of the right to decent working time for domestic workers. The 
purpose of this chapter is to discuss the working time regulation for 
domestic workers from a materialist feminist perspective.  
6.1 ‘Work like any other, work like no 
other’ 
As acknowledged by the Preamble to the Domestic Workers Convention, 
domestic work continues to be ‘undervalued and invisible’. According to 
materialist feminist theory, this is as result of women being defined as 
housewives in contrast to their worker husbands in the international division 
of labor (Mies, 1986, pp. 109–110). As women are reduced to non-workers, 
their work is reduced to non-work. Housework is transformed into a ‘natural 
attribute of [the] female physique and personality, an internal need, an 
aspiration, supposedly coming  from the depth of [the] female character’ 
(Federici, 2012, p. 16). Such patriarchal notions of women’s nature 
constitute the skeleton of a capitalist system that needs an unwaged 
housewife for the reproductive labor needed to sustain the wage-worker 
(Mies, 1986, p. 38). Since this work is unwaged, the cost of women’s labor 
is not covered by capitalists but externalized (Mies, 1986, pp. 109–110). 
This notion of housework as non-work permeates our understanding of 
domestic work even in waged form. The relationship between the domestic 
worker and the household is commonly defined by the employer as a ‘close, 
amicable interaction’, a definition that may reproduce: 
‘a form of paternalism that is thought to justify domestic workers 
being asked to work harder and longer for a “considerate” employer 
without material reward. In fact, these arrangements are the vestiges 
of the master–servant relationship, wherein domestic work is a 
“status” which attaches to the person performing the work, defines 
him or her and limits all future options. Informal norms and some 
entitlements do develop, but they are subject to a power imbalance 
that leaves domestic workers without the kind of protection that other 
 59 
workers enjoy in the formal economy’ (International Labour 
Conference, 2010, p. 12). 
Domestic work is defined by the ILO as ‘work like any other, work like no 
other’ – an acknowledgement of the special status of domestic labor in the 
world of work and in society at large (International Labour Conference, 
2010, p. 12).  
This view of domestic work prevails in Thailand and Sweden. The role of 
domestic work in the ‘larger economy and general social good’ in Thailand 
is only partially recognized by the legislator (Boonitand, 2010, p. 3). 
Improvements in the regulation of working conditions in domestic work are 
recent: before 2012, domestic work was defined as informal work by the 
authorities (ibid.). As a result, domestic work was excluded from important 
provisions on working time.  
Similarly, domestic work was unregulated in Swedish labor law for a 
long time (Calleman, 2007, p. 112). The ‘contrast’ between industrial 
employment and domestic work rendered extensive regulation of the latter 
unnecessary, according to the preparatory work of early legislation (ibid.). 
Today, Swedish labor legislation regulates the working time of domestic 
workers employed in home-services companies as well as private 
households.  
However, a large percentage of domestic workers in Sweden are self-
employed, and thus outside the scope of protective labor legislation. 
According to Mies (1986, pp. 126–127), turning women into ‘small 
entrepreneurs’ rather than employees makes ‘unrestricted exploitation and 
super-exploitation possible’. The introduction of new forms of work 
motivated by a need for ‘flexibilization of labor’, women’s productive work 
is once again being obscured, as they are:  
‘pushed out of the formal sector … [and] reintegrated into capitalist 
development in a whole range of informal, non-organized, non-
protected production relations, ranging from part-time work, through 
contract work, to homeworking, to unpaid neighborhood work’ (Mies, 
1986, pp. 126–127).  
This renaissance of self-employment during recent decades has largely been 
driven by women’s increasing participation in the labor market. Self-
employment may on the one hand be a way for women to achieve greater 
autonomy, while on the other hand may lead to precariousness (Fudge, 
2006, p. 201–204). According to Fudge (ibid.), female self-employment 
challenges ‘simple dichotomy between subordination and independence’ in 
our understanding of self-employment, informed by the male entrepreneur. 
Since the expansion of the Swedish domestic service sector in 1990s, 
working conditions in domestic work is no longer principally addressed by 
the Domestic Work Act. Today, domestic work is included in the scope of 
regular working time legislation, when performed by employees of home-
services companies. At the same time, the increase in female 
entrepreneurship that Mies speaks of has occurred. The introduction of 
flexible forms of work – the reorganization of labor – in industrialized 
countries such as Sweden, is a re-introduction of the ‘way in which Third 
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World women are at present integrated into capitalist development’ (Mies, 
1986, pp. 126–127).  
While the work of these self-employed – the female entrepreneurs – is 
formal work per se, working conditions that pertains to working hours are 
unregulated by labor legislation. In this sense, domestic work and perhaps 
women’s labor in general is still denied recognition as real work.   
6.2 ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ Women in the 
International Division of Labor   
According to Mies, divisions among men and women based on race, 
nationality and other divides are inherent in the global capitalist system: 
‘… every division among us expresses the division of labor: the 
quantity of work and the wages or lack of wages mapped out for each 
particular sector. Depending on who we are – what combination of 
sex, race, age, nation, physical dis/ability, and so  on – we are pushed 
into one or other of these niches which seems out natural destiny 
rather than our job’ (James, 2012, p. 176). 
Mies speaks of the construction of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ women, where women 
in the global North are ‘highlighted as mothers and consumers’, while 
women in the global South act as ‘producers’ of goods and services (Mies, 
1986, p. 125). Women employed in domestic work in the new international 
division of labor constitute Mies’ ‘bad’ women: female workers from low- 
and middle-income countries who provide much of the reproductive work 
needed in the global North, as domestic workers, nannies and cleaners 
(Federici, 2012, p. 71).  
As these women leave their home countries to shoulder the 
responsibilities needed to reproduce the workforce in the global North, their 
own family life may suffer. As women are the main caretakers globally, a 
‘care drain’ is created as they leave children and other relatives behind in 
their country of origin (Shmulyar Gréen, 2013, p. 170–171). Salazar 
Parreñas (2005, p. 138) speaks of ‘global care chains’ – a ‘three-tier transfer 
of care among women in sending and receiving countries of migration … 
[where] class-privileged women pass down the care of their families to 
migrant domestic workers as migrant domestic workers simultaneously pass 
down the care of their of their own families … to even poorer women’.   
These structures prevail in domestic work in Thailand and Sweden. In 
both countries, migrant women make up a large portion of the workforce is 
in the domestic work sector. In recent years, Sweden has seen an increase in 
migration from women from Eastern Europe (Calleman, 2006, p. 10). While 
formal employment in domestic service is frequently viewed as an 
important step to combat social exclusion among migrants in Sweden, 
migrant workers and asylum seekers are also discussed in terms of an 
‘expanding exploitable pool of “flexible” labour’ as these workers accept 
wages and working conditions that Swedish women do not (Gavanas, 2010, 
p. 10). In Thailand, workers from Burma, Laos, and Cambodia constitute 
over 90 percent of the workforce. Individual employers in Sweden cite 
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‘flexibility in terms of number of hours and when those hours are worked’ 
as a benefit of employing migrant workers (Anderson and O’Connell 
Davidson, 2003, p. 30). In contrast, Swedish workers are seen as too 
‘governed by rules’ and ‘spoiled in the sense that they are able to turn down 
work because of the social security system, or that they [have] recourse to 
the labour movement’ (Anderson and O’Connell Davidson, 2003, p. 30). 
The same distinction between migrant workers and nationals is made by 
households in Thailand. Burmese workers are particularly desirable, as Thai 
employers characterize them as ‘cheap, hardworking, and obedient’ 
(Anderson and O’Connell Davidson, 2003, p. 30).  
This distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ women to speak with Mies, 
i.e. the division between ‘good’ women whose needs dictate the working 
hours of the ‘bad’ women, is also codified in the national legislation. The 
fact that daily and weekly working hours in domestic work is unregulated in 
Thai law, while other employees enjoy legal limitations to their working 
time, mimics the hierarchical relation between women. The inferior 
regulation of domestic workers’ working day is a display of indifference 
towards their time – their time that is also their life (James, 2012, p. 106). 
This is also a denial of their right to decent working time. Another example 
of how legislation echoes this distinction between women is the more 
generous regulation of working time for domestic workers with care 
responsibilities employed in Swedish households. This focus on the 
reproductive needs of employer’s family and the disregard for the needs of 
the worker’s family can be related to the different roles of women as 
mothers and producers, stemming from our different, designated ‘niches’ 
(James, 2012, p. 176).  
Mies views the disregard for the family life of the domestic worker as a 
natural component of the division of labor and the roles of women in the 
rich and poor world:  
‘If, in the course of this process of super-exploitation, they themselves 
and their children are destroyed, there is no great regret, for as 
breeders and consumers these women are seen as a threat to the global 
system’ (Mies, 1986, p. 123).  
Federici likens the current international polarization between women in the 
global North and the global South today with the organizing structural 
principle between white and black women under the apartheid regime in 
South Africa’ (2012, p. 73). In her view, we now have a ‘new colonial 
solution to the “housework question”’ (Federici, 2012, p. 73).  
6.3 The Domestic Workers Convention 
from a Materialist Feminist 
Perspective  
The 2011 Domestic Workers Convention is an attempt to extend decent 
working conditions to domestic work. According to materialist feminist 
theory, the poor working conditions in waged domestic work are 
intrinsically linked to the international division of reproductive labor along 
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gender, race, and class lines. To what extent does the new convention 
address this issue in relation to decent working time from a materialist 
feminist perspective?  
The Preamble of the Domestic Workers Convention acknowledges the 
special character of domestic work in the world of work. The new 
convention reiterates the application of general standards to domestic work 
and creates new standards specific to domestic workers. The adoption of the 
convention is a step towards wider recognition of domestic work as work. 
According to the Preamble, it is an attempt to place this type of work, which 
‘continues to be undervalued and invisible and is mainly carried out by 
women and girls, many of whom are migrants … and who are particularly 
vulnerable to discrimination in respect of conditions of employment and of 
work, and to other abuses of human rights’, on equal footing with other 
sectors. Article 10 explicitly requires state parties to the convention to ‘take 
measures towards ensuring equal treatment between domestic workers and 
workers generally’ in the area of working time (para. 1).  
But how may improvements in working conditions and increasing labor 
costs be reconciled with the current informality in domestic work? Tomei 
(2011, p. 282) points out that ‘granting domestic workers … less volatile 
working hours … has the effect of raising the cost of domestic services that 
state incentives can offset only in part. This, in turn, jeopardizes the viability 
of significant improvements in domestic workers’ working conditions’. 
Formal requirements on working time may not lead very far in a system that 
is built on the premise of this work being performed for free or at a low cost. 
It may also push domestic work further into informality, as a way to 
decrease the cost of labor. As discussed above, formal domestic work is 
intrinsically connected to the informal economy. Although domestic work is 
no longer regarded as informal work by the Thai authorities, these workers – 
and employers – are often acting outside the scope of law. Domestic 
workers in Sweden often combine a formal employment with informal work 
in the same households.  
While the Domestic Workers Convention is an attempt to formalize 
domestic work, it does not – and perhaps, cannot – challenge the 
international division of labor in reproduction. Rather, in its provisions on 
equality and the right to 24 hours of weekly rest, the convention mirrors 
international labor standards on working time that have cemented the ‘male 
breadwinner/female caregiver gender contract’ (Vosko, 2006, pp. 55–56).  
The 48-hour working week as introduced by the Hours of Work (Industry) 
Convention, is based on the ‘assumption that unpaid (presumably female) 
caregivers would provide for male workers’ reproduction outside the labour 
force’ (Vosko, 2011, p. 61).  
In materialist feminist theory, the recognition of reproductive labor as 
work aims to expose the super-exploitation of unwaged women in a 
capitalist-patriarchy. The ultimate aim, however, is to force a reorganization 
of housework outside the market. Thus, materialist feminist criticism of 
current working time norms for domestic workers in national and 
international law is not leveled solely with the purpose to achieve decent 
wages for housework or decent working time. Rather, the aim is to ‘de-link 
our reproduction from the commodity flows that through the world market 
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are responsible for the dispossession of so many people in other parts of the 
world’ (Federici, 2012, p. 144). Despite the appearance of an ‘increased 
interconnectedness’ globally, the distance between middle-class employer in 
Sweden or Thailand and the family of the domestic worker in her country of 
origin is wider than ever (Federici, 2012, p. 145). In the global North, the 
global care chains are invisible. Materialist feminism seeks the 
collectivization of housework, i.e. a reorganization of care work outside the 
global market where this work currently is performed ‘at the cost of the 
health of the provider’ (Federici, 2012, p. 146). From a materialist feminist 
perspective, the convention limits the impact of domestic work on the health 
of the provider, but may be ineffective as a means to challenge the current 
international division of labor.   
6.4 Concluding Remarks 
Through the gendered allocation of labor, women have been designated the 
role of housewife. Despite the increasing presence of women on the labor 
market, the concept of the capitalist couple – the male breadwinner and the 
female housewife – lives on. As women are increasingly unable to take on 
unpaid housework due to waged labor, other women step in. In Thailand 
and Sweden, households in the upper and middle classes often hire domestic 
workers to take care of the housework. The domestic worker is often viewed 
as a subordinate to the woman in the household, who often takes on the task 
to lead the work and instruct the worker (Anderson, 2000, p. 18). Due to her 
gender and the tasks she is employed to perform, the domestic worker 
highly resembles the housewife. Thus, her status as a worker is obscured 
and her work is treated as ‘a natural resource, freely available like air and 
water’ (Mies, 1986, pp. 109–110). 
As her work devalued and the length of the working day for the domestic 
worker is obscured, so is the recognition of the worker’s life outside work 
repressed. Considerations of parameters of decent working time such as a 
sound work-family balance, seem absent in the regulation of working 
conditions in domestic work. 
From the perspective of material feminism, these factors could explain 
the inadequacies of the regulation and protection of the right to decent 
working time for domestic workers in Thailand and Sweden. The regulation 
of working time is also affected by the lack of recognition of housework as 
real work, despite the presence of a wage. The tasks of paid domestic 
workers resemble those of a loving mother rather than the traditional wage-
worker, as discussed above. Rather than being caused by the national 
circumstances, the lack of regulation is a result of the role of domestic work 
in the international division of labor.  
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